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Abstract 
US President Donald Trump has cast doubt on his country’s security 
commitments within NATO by his “America First” programme and his 
verbal attacks on the Alliance. This affects both conventional reassurance, 
i.e. pledges to allies backed by non-nuclear military means, and nuclear 
reassurance. 
Beyond the “Trump factor”, the costs and risks associated with these 
security commitments have increased from Washington’s perspective. The 
reasons are the expansion of the Alliance territory through its eastern 
enlargement, the modernisation of the Russian military, and the end of the 
US’s undisputed military supremacy. Nevertheless, during the Trump 
administration, the US has not reduced but increased its financial and 
military contributions to the reassurance of its allies. 
Uncertainties about the US’s role in NATO have led to deepening rifts in 
Europe. On one side are the European allies that are striving for a higher 
degree of “strategic autonomy” from Washington, and on the other those 
who want to lean even more on the US as a protecting power. From the 
perspective of many eastern NATO states, American security promises are 
more credible than potential European alternatives, even during the Trump 
administration. 
The credibility of American security commitments is a multifaceted issue 
that cannot be reduced to statements by the US President. European NATO 
states consider and weight the underlying factors differently. Political deci-
sion-makers, not least in Germany, must be alert to these differences for the 
sake of political cohesion in the EU and NATO. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
A Matter of Credibility. Conventional and 
Nuclear Security Commitments of the 
United States in Europe 
With his “America First” programme and verbal at-
tacks on NATO, US President Donald Trump has cast 
significant doubt on the credibility of American secu-
rity commitments within the Alliance. This applies 
to both its conventional and nuclear aspects. For the 
purposes of this research paper, “conventional reas-
surance” is understood as those pledges to allies that 
are underpinned by non-nuclear military means, and 
“nuclear reassurance” as the commitments under-
pinned by nuclear military means. 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty postulates that 
member states shall regard an attack on one as an at-
tack on all. This political commitment is underpinned 
by the presence of US troops and military capabilities 
in Europe. For decades, Alliance members therefore 
shared the assumption that in the event of a crisis or 
war, Washington would assist its NATO partners with 
conventional and, in extreme situations, nuclear 
weapons. The USA was the only NATO state with the 
political will and capabilities to guarantee the secu-
rity of the entire Alliance territory. 
How credible are American security commitments 
in times of Trump? In the German political debate 
doubts are gaining ground. This is why there is in-
creasing discussion about how Europe can become 
more independent of Washington in terms of security 
policy. Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel said in May 
2017 that the “times when we could completely rely 
on others [...] are largely over”. In France, arguing for 
European strategic autonomy has a long tradition. 
By contrast, some eastern NATO states, primarily 
Poland, the Baltic states and Romania, have been 
relying even more heavily on America as a protecting 
power since Trump took office. Yet again other coun-
tries, such as the Czech Republic and Hungary, are 
making efforts to move closer to Russia, at least in 
some policy fields such as energy. Obviously, European 
states view American security and defence policy very 
differently. These divergent perspectives are a prob-
lem for cohesion both in the European Union (EU) 
and in NATO. 
This study focuses on three factors that underlie 
the credibility of American reassurance: 
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∎ 1. the political support for alliance commitments 
of the relevant domestic actors in the USA; 
∎ 2. the development of the security environment, 
in particular the military (im-) balances in specific 
parts of Europe; and 
∎ 3. the concrete financial and military contributions 
of the USA towards underpinning its security com-
mitments in the light of the changing security 
landscape. 
European allies assess and weight these three factors 
differently based on their respective security and 
threat perceptions. This study confines itself to 
examining the perspectives of several Eastern NATO 
countries that feel particularly exposed to Russia. 
Doubts about the credibility of America’s Alliance 
commitments arise above all with regard to the first 
two factors: political support within the USA and the 
development of the security environment. The third 
factor, the concrete financial and military contribu-
tions of the USA to European security, thus gains con-
siderably in importance. 
Overall, German and European actors have very 
few opportunities to directly influence the credibility 
of American reassurance. The most feasible way to 
achieve this is to politically strengthen those forces in 
the US administration and Congress who advocate 
the continued integration of the US into the Alliance. 
The basic prerequisite for this political support is 
reliable financial and military contributions from 
Germany and other European states to the joint task 
of collective defence. If European partners are unable 
to provide at least some of the critical conventional 
capabilities for this mission, NATO supporters in the 
US will have an increasingly poor foundation for 
their arguments. 
As regards nuclear weapons, Europe’s ability to 
achieve credible reassurance on its own without the 
US is even more limited than with conventional 
capabilities. The majority of European NATO states, 
including Germany, have relatively little interest in 
nuclear issues. Most of the states that regard nuclear 
deterrence as still important for national defence 
policy see no alternative to America’s promises of 
protection, even under the Trump administration. 
For the eastern NATO states, the credibility of 
American nuclear reassurance is based on a political 
and strategic understanding of the importance of 
these weapons. The decisive factors are therefore 
that the USA politically commits itself to extended 
nuclear deterrence – as indicated in its current 
nuclear strategy of 2018 – and that, under Trump, 
neither friend nor foe can assess with absolute cer-
tainty how the USA would react in the event of a 
nuclear crisis. 
Yet issues of specific nuclear capability – i.e. how 
many weapons are stationed on which carrier systems 
in Europe, and what their explosive yield is – are of 
little relevance to the eastern NATO states. Debates on 
these issues therefore risk splitting NATO rather than 
contributing to the credibility of reassurance. 
In view of the domestic developments in the USA, 
of which President Trump is a symptom rather than a 
cause, it may be true that Europe should be striving 
for greater defence autonomy from the USA. Security 
commitments that European states make to each 
other within the framework of a European Defence 
Union must be measured by the same standards that 
have applied to the USA for more than seven decades. 
In order to be credible, reciprocal security pledges 
made by European states must therefore be backed by 
strong political will in their capitals as well as suffi-
cient financial and military resources. Above all, 
these security pledges must be seen as credible by 
all states that are part of the European integration 
project within the EU and NATO. 
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Definition and Criteria 
This study focuses on America’s security commit-
ments to its NATO allies, i.e. the issue of reassurance. 
This must be distinguished from deterrence, which 
addresses the potential opponents of an alliance. The 
two concepts are closely linked, but not identical. 
There is little doubt that the US would defend its 
security when countering threats to its own territory. 
Credibility becomes problematic in security pledges 
to partners and allies. According to Thomas Schelling, 
the difference “between the national homeland and 
everything ’ abroad’ is the difference between threats 
that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and 
the threats that have to be made credible.”1 
Although a great deal of academic literature has 
dealt with the question of the credibility of US secu-
rity and defence policy – especially with regard to 
nuclear deterrence – the term “credibility” remains 
remarkably unclear. This may be due to the fact that 
since credibility is a largely subjective phenomenon, 
it is difficult to grasp. Whether or not the USA is 
credible is ultimately decided by the addressees of 
American policy – both its allies and its opponents.2 
The credibility of security commitments and 
reassurance is understood in this study as the well-
founded and comprehensible expectation of Europe-
an NATO partners that Washington will honour its 
security pledges made within the framework of the 
Alliance. These expectations are well-founded and 
comprehensible in as the sense that they are based on 
an analysis of US interests and a cost-benefit calculus 
of these commitments for Washington. This distin-
 
1 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence. With a New Fore-
word and Preface, The Henry L. Stimson Lectures (New Haven, 
2008), 36. 
2 See Robert J. McMahon, “Credibility and World Power. 
Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American 
Diplomacy”, Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (1991): 455–72 (457). 
guishes credibility from other concepts such as “trust” 
or “reputation”. Trust is based on social and personal 
ties; reputation on the past behaviour of states, groups 
or individuals and the expectation that they will con-
tinue to behave in the same or similar manner in the 
future.3 
Credibility depends on three factors: 
political will, the military balance of 
power and specific military 
contributions.  
Three factors can be derived from this definition of 
credibility so as to assess and classify it, although not 
exactly “measure” it. The first is the political will in 
the relevant centres of power within the American 
system of government. To what extent do US security 
commitments to NATO partners enjoy political sup-
port in the White House, the administrative appa-
ratus and Congress? Is the security of European NATO 
countries defined as a significant US interest for 
which America would be willing, in the event of a 
crisis or armed conflict, to assume the costs and risks 
of using military force? 
The second factor for assessing credibility is the 
changes in the European security environment, 
mainly the development of military balances and 
capabilities. These developments determine the costs 
and risks that Washington bears for its NATO com-
mitments. The greater the imbalance to the detriment 
of the US and NATO, the greater the risk and likeli-
hood that, in the event of a conflict, the security 
 
3 In his historical study, Daryl Press has shown that the 
credibility of military threats in the eyes of those being 
threatened does not primarily depend on past behavioural 
patterns, but on the interests of the threatening state and its 
specific military and economic capabilities. See Daryl G. 
Press, Calculating Credibility. How Leaders Assess Military Threats, 
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, 2005), 24. 
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pledges cannot be honoured – and therefore the 
lower the pledges’ credibility. 
The third factor is the financial, military and 
operational capabilities with which the USA buttress-
es its security commitments. The larger these contri-
butions are, and the more specifically tailored they 
are to the security situation in Europe, the more 
credible the security pledges appear. Such specific 
contributions underline Washington’s willingness 
to translate words into deeds and to provide actual 
resources. The probability that the security of Euro-
pean NATO partners can be successfully defended in 
the event of a crisis or war also increases. 
These three factors, on which the credibility of US 
security commitments is based, are considered and 
weighted by NATO allies through the lenses of their 
respective national experiences and security percep-
tions. 
Reassurance: the Conventional 
and Nuclear Aspects 
There are important differences between the conven-
tional and the nuclear dimensions of security reas-
surances. 
The threat or actual use of nuclear weapons would 
mean crossing a political and psychological threshold. 
In such a situation controlling escalation becomes 
considerably more difficult or even impossible. The 
risk of a comprehensive nuclear war, which would be 
tantamount to the complete destruction of the parties 
involved, would move within reach. This also applies 
when, in a crisis situation, “only” non-strategic nucle-
ar weapons4 are used to begin with. 
Against this background, the nuclear reassurance 
of the USA towards its NATO partners is always in-
herently lacking credibility. Why should the US risk 
Washington being destroyed to guarantee the safety 
of Berlin or Tallinn? Nevertheless, the USA still under-
pins its security commitments to more than 30 coun-
tries across the globe – NATO members, South Korea, 
Japan and Australia – with nuclear weapons.5 
 
4 “Non-strategic” (also called “tactical”) nuclear weapons 
are those that are not covered by the New Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (New START). “Strategic weapons” in the 
sense of New START are land- and sea-based ballistic missiles 
with a range of more than 5,500 km as well as nuclear 
armed “strategic” bombers. 
5 See Stéfanie von Hlatky, “American Alliances and Extend-
ed Deterrence”, in The Future of Extended Deterrence. The United 
There are two alternative views in the research 
literature as to why nuclear commitments can still be 
credible.6 According to the political and strategic per-
spective, nuclear pledges or threats are essentially a 
“competition in risk-taking”.7 The nuclear powers 
take institutional or military steps that increase the 
risk of escalation, even to the point of nuclear war, 
without either side being able to fully control the 
process. For example, they can station troops in sensi-
tive regions as “trip wires” or set up automatic action-
response mechanisms.8 According to Schelling, it is 
the strategic weapons that constitute the risk of mu-
tual annihilation. In this sense, however, all nuclear 
weapons are “strategic”.9 From this perspective, the 
specific nuclear capability – i.e. the number of nu-
clear weapons, their explosive yield, delivery systems 
and deployment sites – is of secondary importance. 
The second view of the credibility of nuclear 
commitments is more “operational” because its focus 
is more on the possibility that deterrence may fail. If 
it were possible, or at least conceivable, to limit the 
damage that a regional war in Europe or Asia, in-
cluding a nuclear war, could do to the USA by means 
of “flexible” options – especially bombs with lower 
explosive yield – the credibility problem would de-
crease. In that case America, as a nuclear guarantor 
power, would have the prospect of not being de-
 
States, NATO, and Beyond, ed. Stéfanie von Hlatky and Andreas 
Wenger (Washington, D. C., 2015), 1–16 (5). 
6 On the two perspectives, see also David S. Yost, “Assur-
ance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO”, International 
Affairs 85, no. 4 (2009): 755-80 (772); Peter Rudolf, US Nuclear 
Deterrence Policy and Its Problems, SWP Research Paper 2018/ 
RP 10 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 
2018), 27, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/us-
nuclear-deterrence-policy-and-its-problems/ (accessed 20 May 
2018). 
7 Schelling, Arms and Influence (see note 1), 91. 
8 ”Automatic action-response mechanisms” are mecha-
nisms that are deliberately intended to restrict one's own 
political scope for action in crisis situations. This is meant to 
increase credibility, both of security commitments to allies 
and of threats to opponents. An example would be the use 
of nuclear weapons in certain situations under extreme time 
pressure and correspondingly prepared protocols: for exam-
ple, when enemy missiles are launched or one’s own troops 
are attacked. 
9 See Schelling, Arms and Influence (see note 1), 110. Schel-
ling clarifies this point using the analogy of a modified chess 
game: a single move can cause both players to lose immedi-
ately. In this version of the game, the white knight is just as 
“powerful” as the black queen. See ibid., 99ff. 
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stroyed itself in the event of a conflict. The threat 
against one’s opponent and the nuclear reassurance 
of one’s own Alliance partners would thus be more 
credible. That, at any rate, is the logic that is also re-
flected in the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy 
of 2018. From this “operational” perspective, the con-
crete design of the US nuclear capability is of great 
importance for the credibility of nuclear reassurance 
vis-à-vis its allies. 
The ambivalence of political 
intentions can increase the credibility 
of nuclear reassurance. 
The following applies to both approaches: all deci-
sion-making processes during a nuclear crisis point 
towards the US president. The classical theory of 
nuclear deterrence postulates that the ambivalence of 
political intentions can even increase the credibility 
of threats.10 In other words, even if it is unlikely that 
the US president – and especially this president – 
would actually be prepared to use nuclear weapons to 
defend European NATO allies, the consequences for 
allies and opponents alike would be grave. The un-
predictability attributed to President Trump may 
therefore prove to be a strength. 
Wars that are fought with conventional weapons 
are – at least in the eyes of political decision-makers 
– more controllable and scalable11 than nuclear 
scenarios. The principle of conventional reassurance 
today has not fundamentally changed since the Cold 
War: by pre-stationing armed forces, the allies in-
volved signal their readiness to be drawn into the 
military conflict at an early stage if another partner is 
attacked. In a conflict constellation between two 
nuclear powers, the purpose of conventional defence 
is either to prevent fait-accompli scenarios12 – i.e. 
a rapid territorial conquest through surprise attacks 
– or to raise the political and military costs for the 
 
10 See Richard J. Harknett, “The Logic of Conventional 
Deterrence and the End of the Cold War”, Security Studies 4, 
no. 1 (1994): 86–114 (102). 
11 The ”scalability” of conventional weapons implies that 
policy-makers are offered a broader spectrum of action than 
with nuclear means. Conventional weapons can be used to 
cause little, moderate or massive damage to the opponent. 
This is not possible with nuclear weapons, or at least not 
possible to the same extent, due to their enormous destruc-
tive power. 
12 See Michael S. Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the 
Second Nuclear Age”, Parameters 39, no. 3 (2009): 32–48 (33). 
attacker. It can also be used to raise the threshold for 
the use of nuclear weapons. 
In the event of a war fought with conventional 
weapons, too, the US president ultimately makes all 
the essential decisions himself. However, since the 
use of conventional means is easier to control and 
scale compared to the use of nuclear weapons, other 
decision-making centres in Washington, notably 
Congress, have more say. In the multilateral context 
of NATO, this means that consensus-building in the 
joint Alliance institutions becomes very important 
during a crisis. When used positively, this can favour 
de-escalation, but it can also lead to a political block-
ade in the NATO Council and thus to the inability 
to act. 
Whether or not promises or threats which are 
underpinned by conventional means are credible 
fundamentally lies in the design of military capabili-
ties and the regional balance of power. Nuclear weap-
ons, due to their great destructive power, leave much 
less room for interpretation with regard to their effec-
tiveness. Conventional means, on the other hand, 
give the potential opponent more opportunities to 
neutralise or mitigate their effect through appropriate 
defensive measures.13 In sum, the credibility of nucle-
ar reassurance is based on a “competition of risk 
taking”, while the credibility of conventional reassur-
ance primarily rests on a competition of capabilities.14 
 
13 See John Stone, “Conventional Deterrence and the 
Challenge of Credibility”, Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 1 
(2012): 108–23 (109). 
14 Richard J. Harknett has formulated this as follows for 
the conventional context: “In a conventional environment, 
the issue of credibility is dominated by suspicion about the 
capability to inflict costs rather than on the decision to inflict 
costs. [...] [T]he most problematic area of conventional deter-
rence is in establishing a credible capability.” See Harknett, 
“The Logic of Conventional Deterrence” (see note 10), 89 
(added emphasis). Even though this assessment relates to 
deterrence, it can also be applied to the notion of reassur-
ance. 
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The political will of key US actors to honor the 
country’s NATO commitments is the first factor by 
which partners assess the credibility of US security 
reassurances. The more unanimous and emphatic 
this willingness, the greater the credibility. 
The broad, bi-partisan support for the integration 
of the United States into NATO has been a fundamen-
tal constant of American security policy for almost 
seven decades after the founding of the Alliance in 
1949. From an American perspective, NATO was the 
central security policy instrument to prevent the 
Soviet Union from dominating Europe. 
Thus, it was irrelevant whether a Democratic or 
Republican administration sat in the White House. 
Of course, there were still domestic debates. Congress 
repeatedly called for more balanced transatlantic 
burden-sharing, which in several cases went as far as 
proposals to reduce US troops in Europe.15 During the 
Vietnam War, the prevailing consensus on the hege-
mony of the USA collapsed. This consensus had im-
plied that America was ready for “almost limitless 
engagement and commitment”16 in security and de-
fence policy to contain the influence of the Soviet 
 
15 In the “great debate” of 1951, Herbert Hoover and the 
Republican Senator Robert Taft called for the reduction of 
US troops in Europe under the motto “Fortress America”. 
The initiatives by the Democratic senators Mike Mansfield in 
1966 and Sam Nunn in 1984 also provided for a reduction of 
US military presence in Europe. See Phil Williams, The Senate 
and US Troops in Europe (New York, 1985), 262, 271, 273. For a 
historical overview of the domestic dimension of the deploy-
ment of American troops in Europe, see Hubert Zimmer-
mann, “The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment. 
America's Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War”, 
Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 1 (2009): 3-27. 
16 Patrick Callahan, Logics of American Foreign Policy. Theories 
of America’s World Role (New York, 2004), 12. 
Union. While support for proxy wars in the “Third 
World” declined, this did not apply to America’s 
security and defence role in Europe.17 Despite all 
controversies, respective US administrations never 
questioned America’s security commitments within 
NATO. 
Since the election of Trump, the 
question of whether the USA could 
revoke its Alliance commitments has 
been raised for the first time. 
Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
strengthening the Alliance remained a central con-
cern to Washington, albeit under changed circum-
stances. Containing Moscow receded into the back-
ground as NATO’s raison d’être, but the Alliance now 
served other interests: crisis management in the West-
ern Balkans, the fight against international terrorism 
and, of course, the global power projection of the 
USA. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, American 
reassurance towards its Alliance partners was based 
on a much smaller US military footprint in Europe. 
Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 
2014, President Obama assured eastern NATO part-
ners that the US would defend “every single ally” be-
cause “the defence of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is 
just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris 
and London”.18 
 
17 See Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security, 
5. ed. (Baltimore, 1999), 80–81. 
18 Quoted in David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, 
Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the De-
fense of the Baltics (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), 3, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_report
s/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf (accessed 21 May 2019). 
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Since Donald Trump’s election to the White House, 
the question of whether Washington could end its 
decades-long policy of Alliance integration and thus 
revoke its promises of protection for its allies has 
been raised seriously for the first time. 
President Trump 
Donald Trump, as presidential candidate and later 
as president, has made contradictory remarks about 
America’s security commitments. Overall, however, 
he has adopted a distanced and sometimes even 
hostile stance towards the US’s security alliances in 
Europe and Asia. He has a transactional understand-
ing of these alliances, i.e. from his point of view they 
are comparable to an insurance policy for which 
the partners have to make a financial contribution. 
Otherwise the insurance cover expires.19 This contra-
dicts the political understanding on which American 
NATO policy has been based for decades: alliance 
commitments, while not unconditional, are based 
first and foremost on shared interests and values. 
As a candidate for the White House, Trump wanted 
to make US support for allies in both Europe and 
Asia conditional on their respective defence contribu-
tions.20 He also explicitly questioned the nuclear com-
ponent of American reassurance vis-à-vis the Asian 
allies. In fact he suggested to Japan and South Korea 
that they should obtain their own nuclear weapons.21 
This would be a radical departure from decades of US 
 
19 In March 2019 US media reported that President Trump 
intended to submit a plan entitled “Costs plus 50” to coun-
tries in which US troops are stationed. This means that 
Alliance partners will not only pay for the full costs of these 
troop deployments, but will also pay a 50 percent surcharge 
as a premium for the American presence. See Ellen Mitchell, 
“Pentagon: Trump’s ‘Cost Plus 50’ Plan Hasn’t Been Dis-
cussed with Europe”, The Hill (online), 13 March 2019, 
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/433883-pentagon-trumps-
cost-plus-50-plan-hasnt-been-discussed-with-europe (accessed 
27 May 2019). 
20 See David E. Sanger and Maggie Haberman, “Donald 
Trump Sets Conditions for Defending NATO Allies against 
Attack”, New York Times (online), 20 July 2016, https://www. 
nytimes.com/2016/07/21/us/politics/donald-trump-issues.html 
(accessed 21 May 2019). 
21 See Stephanie Condon, “Donald Trump: Japan, South 
Korea Might Need Nuclear Weapons”, CBS News (online), 
29 March 2016, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-
trump-japan-south-korea-might-need-nuclear-weapons/ 
(accessed 21 May 2019). 
policy, which regarded extended nuclear deterrence22 
as an essential instrument for the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 
As president, Trump eventually committed to 
Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, albeit hesitatingly. How-
ever, he once again distanced himself from it during 
the NATO summit in July 2018. According to diplo-
mats, behind closed doors he threatened the assem-
bled NATO leaders with Washington going its own 
way on defence issues in the future if the other NATO 
countries did not quickly spend more money on their 
defence.23 Shortly afterwards, in an interview with the 
television channel Fox News, he sowed doubts as to 
whether America would defend the newest NATO 
accession state, Montenegro, in the event of an attack, 
because the people there were “aggressive” and could 
drag the USA into the Third World War.24 According 
to a New York Times report, in 2018 Trump repeatedly 
told advisors that he wanted to withdraw the USA 
from NATO.25 Publicly, however, the president said 
Washington was “100 percent” behind the Alliance.26 
What is truly explosive about Trump’s remarks 
on NATO is not that he is particularly insistent or 
less diplomatic in demanding more defence burden-
sharing from European Allies (a demand shared by 
many European and American commentators). Nor 
is it the fact that the president is linking economic 
issues (e.g. the EU’s trade surplus with the USA) and 
defence policy issues. During the Cold War, John F. 
Kennedy and other US presidents also pointed to 
balance of payments problems in connection with 
the presence of US troops overseas, and demanded 
economic compensation from Germany. 
The stand-out factor is that Trump is the first US 
president to distance himself from the US security 
 
22 ”Extended nuclear deterrence” means the US threat of 
using nuclear weapons not only to protect American territo-
ry, but also that of its allies. 
23 See Lorenz Hemicker and Michael Stabenow, “Trump 
lässt die Puppen tanzen”, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
13 July 2018, p. 2. 
24 Quoted in “Trump: I’m Not Pro-Russia, I Just Want Our 
Country Safe”, Fox News, 17 July 2018. 
25 See Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Trump Discus-
sed Pulling U. S. from NATO, Aides Say amid New Concerns 
over Russia”, New York Times, 14 January 2019. 
26 Quoted in Joe Gould, “US House Votes Overwhelmingly 
to Bar US Exit from NATO”, Defense News (online), 22 January 
2019, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2019/01/23/us-
house-votes-overwhelmingly-to-bar-us-exit-from-nato/ 
(accessed 21 May 2019). 
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commitments to NATO allies and to attach specific 
conditions to it. This is a move away from the prin-
ciple that the security of NATO territory is indivisible, 
which had previously been sacrosanct in Washington. 
Trump’s repeated verbal attacks on NATO (“obsolete”, 
“as bad as NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agree-
ment]”27, etc.) illustrate this sea change. 
US policy towards NATO during Trump’s first two-
and-a-half years in office has contributed to the dis-
trust felt in some European capitals at statements 
made by other high-ranking US officials. US Vice Pre-
sident Mike Pence said at the Munich Security Con-
ference in February 2019 that the US “cannot ensure 
the defense of the West if our allies grow dependent 
on the East”.28 Particularly in Germany, this was seen 
as a barely veiled threat regarding the dispute over 
the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline under construction 
between Germany and Russia. The fact that at the be-
ginning of his speech Pence unequivocally reaffirmed 
the US commitments to mutual defence within NATO 
did not change this perception. 
The Administration 
The term “administration” is often used in connection 
with American government policy. This is a collective 
term which in the area of foreign and security affairs 
includes the president’s closest advisory circle (nation-
al security advisor, foreign and defence ministers, 
leading military personnel), the presidential bureau-
cracy (especially the National Security Council), and 
the ministerial bureaucracies (foreign and defence 
ministries). The administration selects and structures 
information, and formulates options, and is therefore 
essential for the preparation and implementation of 
the president’s decisions. 
 
27 Quoted in Jonathan Swan, “Scoop: Trump’s Private 
NATO Trashing Rattles Allies”, Axios (online), 28 June 2018, 
https://www.axios.com/donald-trump-foreign-policy-europe-
nato-allies-worried-bd1e143a-e73a-415b-b688-
d18ab2d902e7.html (accessed 21 May 2019). 
28 The White House, “Remarks by Vice President Pence at 
the 2019 Munich Security Conference”, Washington, D.C., 
16 February 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2019-munich-
security-conference-munich-germany/ (accessed 3 May 2019). 
Numerous media reports and recently published 
books by investigative journalists29 or former adminis-
trative staff paint the picture of a White House work-
ing chaotically for long stretches, with staff devoting 
a considerable part of their energy to controlling their 
president or even actively countering his agenda. 
Sometimes there is even talk of a “dual presidency” in 
which the administration pursues an agenda that is 
diametrically opposed to the president’s.30 
As far as US security and defence policy in NATO 
is concerned, this characterisation is quite accurate: 
all three consecutive National Security Advisors – 
Michael Flynn, Herbert Raymond McMaster and John 
Bolton – have tried to keep their president from his 
verbal attacks on NATO. Former Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson, together with Flynn, has advocated for 
Montenegro’s accession to NATO and thus for an ex-
tension of American security pledges to the country, 
both in front of Trump and the Senate.31 
The view that the USA is a global 
leading power is still firmly anchored 
in Washington’s administrative 
apparatus. 
Even Bolton, who is watched like a hawk in Europe 
because of his earlier remarks on possible military 
strikes against North Korea and Iran, and his hostility 
to multilateralism and the United Nations, worked 
with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to prevent a 
failure of the NATO summit in July 2018. Both urged 
 
29 See Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury. Inside the Trump White 
House (New York, 2018); Bob Woodward, Fear. Trump in the 
White House (London and New York et al., 2018). 
30 Elizabeth N. Saunders, “Sure, Trump’s Advisers Aren’t 
the First to Push Back against a President. But What’s 
Happening Now Is Completely Unprecedented”, Washington 
Post (online), 6 September 2018. An opinion piece by an 
unnamed “senior official” garnered most attention: “I Am 
Part of the Resistance inside the Trump Administration”, 
New York Times (online), 5 September 2018, https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-
anonymous-resistance.html (accessed 21 May 2019). 
31 See Andrew Hanna, “Flynn to Recommend Trump 
Back NATO Membership for Montenegro”, Politico (online), 
6 February 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/ 
trump-nato-montenegro-michael-flynn-234697 (accessed 
21 May 2019); Ellen Mitchell, “Rand Paul Roils the Senate 
with NATO Blockade”, The Hill (online), 22 March 2017, 
https://thehill.com/news-by-subject/defense-homeland-
security/325091-rand-paul-roils-the-senate-with-nato-
blockade (accessed 6 May 2019). 
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that the summit declaration be finalised long before 
the meeting, thus removing it from Trump’s notice as 
far as possible.32 In both the US and Europe, Defence 
Secretary James Mattis was regarded as the most im-
portant NATO supporter within the Trump admin-
istration until he resigned in early January 2019. His 
successor, Mark Esper, has so far also expressed his 
strong support for NATO and other US alliances. 
Below the leadership level of advisors and cabinet 
members, the administration is also essentially char-
acterised by a foreign and security policy elite within 
the institutions and ministries. This elite has been 
habituated over seven decades to the role of the 
USA as a leading power and is “internationalist to 
its core”,33 including the understanding that the USA 
bases its international leadership role essentially on 
alliances. Above all, the US Department of Defence 
and the military appear in the administrative appara-
tus as advocates for the US-led alliances and are there-
fore of great relevance for underpinning security 
commitments to NATO partners. 
Even though the Pentagon and military are not a 
monolithic bloc, the civilian and military leadership 
in the Department of Defence nevertheless supports 
firmly anchoring the United States in the Alliance 
as well as America’s continued military presence in 
Europe. Since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 
2014, the US forces’ European Command (EUCOM) 
and its commander-in-chief – who are presumably 
not devoid of institutional self-interest – have advo-
cated strengthening American contributions to NATO 
reassurance and have intensively promoted this 
in Congress.34 Former EUCOM chief General Curtis 
Scaparrotti even pleaded in 2018 for more US troops 
to be permanently stationed in Europe.35 
 
32 See Helene Cooper and Julian E. Barnes, “Rush to 
Protect NATO Accord against Trump”, New York Times, 
10 August 2018. 
33 Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump 
(Washington, D.C., 2018), 124. 
34 See United States European Command (USEUCOM), 
EUCOM Posture Statement 2018. Statement of General Curtis M. 
Scaparrotti, United States Army Commander, United States Euro-
pean Command before the United States Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, Stuttgart, 8 March 2018, https://www.eucom. 
mil/media-library/article/36269/eucom-2018-posture-
statement (accessed 21 May 2019). 
35 See USEUCOM, House Armed Services Committee Hearing 
on Security Challenges in Europe (Stuttgart, 15 March 2018), 
https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/transcript/36275/house-
Beyond its European command the American mili-
tary continues to have a great interest in integration 
into NATO. Since 2015, if not before (in other words, 
under the Obama administration) the security and 
defence policy priorities within the military appara-
tus have once again shifted towards great power 
rivalries.36 The focus is on Russia and China. At the 
same time, other tasks of the military, such as crisis 
management, counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism, 
have receded into the background. During this shift 
of focus, NATO, like other traditional alliances of the 
United States, has gained in importance from the 
point of view of the military. 
The unambiguous support of the administrative 
apparatus for NATO and for America’s security com-
mitments within the Alliance is also reflected in the 
strategic policy documents. These bear the hallmark 
of the national security bureaucracy. The 2017 
National Security Strategy (NSS), for instance, states that 
the United States sees “the invaluable advantages 
that our strong relationships with allies and partners 
deliver” and that it “remains committed to Article V 
of the Washington Treaty [on collective defence]”.37 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy contains an identical 
commitment to America’s alliance pledges, while at 
the same time exhorting NATO partners to imple-
ment the higher defence spending that they them-
selves have pledged.38 
 
armed-services-committee-hearing-on-security-challenges-
ineurope (accessed 21 May 2019). 
36 The 2015 military strategy drafted by the Obama ad-
ministration’s Joint Chiefs of Staff already reflected the US 
military's desire to oppose “revisionist states” – it listed 
Russia, Iran, North Korea and China – and advocated 
strengthening the global network of US alliances and part-
ners to this end. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military 
Strategy of the United States of America 2015. The United States 
Military's Contribution to National Security (Fort Belvoir: United 
States Department of Defense [DoD], 2015), 1-2, https://www. 
jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_ 
Military_Strategy.pdf (accessed 21 May 2019). 
37 National Security Strategy [NSS] of the United States of America 
(Washington, D.C.: President of the United States of America, 
December 2017), 2, 48, https://www. whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 
(accessed 6 May 2019). 
38 See James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: DoD, 
January 2018), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ 
pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed 
20 May 2019). 
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Several passages of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
of 2018 commit the USA to extended nuclear deter-
rence, i.e. to underpinning American promises of 
protection to its allies with nuclear weapons.39 
Despite Trump’s fundamentally disapproving stance 
towards multilateral institutions, the USA still seems 
to adhere to joint nuclear consultations and planning 
under his presidency.40 Since the establishment of 
the Nuclear Planning Group in the 1960s, these have 
been an essential pillar of the credibility of US nucle-
ar reassurance. Finally, in line with the Missile Defense 
Review (MDR) published in 2019, US missile defence 
capabilities are intended not only to protect American 
territory, but also to reassure allies and partners.41 
Congress 
The legislative branch in the USA has a number of 
long levers in security and defence policy vis-à-vis the 
president and administration. Congress has the sole 
right to establish and maintain armed forces, and to 
declare war. It also adopts sanctions legislation and 
controls the budget. 
In Congress, there has traditionally been bi-parti-
san support for NATO. The Russian annexation of 
the Crimean peninsula and the war in eastern Ukraine 
have increased rather than decreased this support. 
However, this also means that US alliance policy is 
associated with an increasingly confrontational atti-
tude towards Russia. This can be seen, for example, 
during the annual hearings on the US Armed Forces’ 
 
39 See DoD, Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] (Washington, D.C., 
February 2018), VIII, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/ 
02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-
FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed 6 May 2019). 
40 Frank Rose, who was in charge of arms control in the 
US State Department during the Obama presidency said: 
“Similar to the 2010 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], the 
2018 NPR established an effective consultation process that 
enabled allies to provide input and help shape the review.” 
Frank A. Rose, Is the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review as Bad as the 
Critics Claim It Is?, Policy Brief (Washington, D.C.: The Brook-
ings Institution, April 2018), 4, https://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/is-the-2018-nuclear-posture-review-as-bad-as-the-
critics-claim-it-is/ (accessed 6 May 2019). 
41 See Executive Summary, National Missile Review [MDR] 
(Washington, D.C.: DoD, January 2019), https://www.defense. 
gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-
Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf 
(accessed 20 May 2019). 
European Command in the relevant committees of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
US military contributions to the conventional re-
assurance of NATO partners and their financial back-
ing in the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) have 
received almost unanimous support in both political 
camps.42 Most debates focus on the need for an effec-
tive deterrent against Moscow.43 Members of Congress 
from both parties were also receptive to the idea of 
stationing American troops permanently – i.e. not 
just on a rotation basis – on the territory of eastern 
NATO allies. The National Defense Authorization Act 
for 2019 mandated the Pentagon to examine this 
option.44 
Positions within Congress regarding the nuclear 
component of reassurance are less consensual. How-
ever, there is no dispute about the extended nuclear 
deterrence per se, only about the design of the US 
nuclear arsenal. While the modernisation of the stra-
tegic “triad” of intercontinental missiles, bombers and 
submarines fundamentally receives support across 
party lines in Congress,45 the Democrats are opposed 
to the procurement of new nuclear weapons with low 
explosive yield.46 In their view, by lowering the 
 
42 This cross-party consensus is evident, for instance, in 
the Congressional debates on US armed forces in Europe. See 
USEUCOM, Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the United 
States European Command, F. Y. [Fiscal Year] 2019, (Stuttgart, 
12 March 2018), https://www.eucom.mil/media-
library/transcript/36273/senate-armed-services-committee-
hearing-on-the-united-stateseuropean-command-f-y-2019 
(accessed 21 May 2019); USEUCOM, House Armed Services 
Committee Hearing (see note 35). 
43 See, e.g., USEUCOM, EUCOM Commander Testifies before 
House Armed Services Committee (Stuttgart, 28 March 2017). 
44 See John Vandiver, “Lawmakers Prod Pentagon to Con-
sider More Europe-based Troops”, Stars & Stripes (online), 
24 July 2018, https://www.stripes.com/news/lawmakers-prod-
pentagon-to-consider-more-europe-based-troops-1.539189 
(accessed 6 May 2019). 
45 See Rose, Is the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review as Bad as the 
Critics Claim It Is? (see note 40), 3. 
46 See Joe Gould, “Tactical Nuclear Weapon Launches 
into Development with Pentagon Policy Bill”, Defense News 
(online), 24 July 2018, 
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/07/24/tactical-
nuclear-weapon-launches-into-development-with-pentagon-
policy-bill/ (accessed 6 May 2019). The 2019 defence budget 
approved by Congress provides US$65 million for the devel-
opment of these sea-based missiles. See Brendan W. McGarry 
and Pat Towell, FY 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. 
An Overview of H. R. 5515, CRS In Focus (Washington, D. C.: 
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threshold for using nuclear arms, these weapons 
increase the risk of nuclear war rather than strength-
ening deterrence against other nuclear powers. 
There are only a few scattered voices in Congress 
that question the principle of the North Atlantic 
Alliance or its basic policies. The independent Senator 
Angus King, for example, referred to the risks that a 
US military build-up in Central Eastern Europe might 
entail for relations with Russia.47 Republican senators 
Mike Lee and Rand Paul have spoken out against the 
inclusion of more member states in the Alliance. 
As long as the US carries the lion’s share of NATO’s 
defence burden, Lee said, “[w]e cannot and should not 
consider expanding these commitments”; the USA 
should not pre-emptively commit itself to waging 
“everyone else’s wars”.48 
Given Trump’s hostile statements on NATO, Con-
gress has repeatedly taken the initiative to demon-
strate US solidarity with its allies. In February 2018, 
Senators Thom Tillis (a Republican) and Jeanne Sha-
heen (a Democrat) revived the Senate NATO Observer 
Group, which will act as a link between the Senate 
and the Alliance to strengthen transatlantic relations. 
The group consists of ten senators in key positions, in-
cluding the chairman and co-chairman of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee.49 
Just before the NATO summit in Brussels in July 
2018, both houses of Congress – the House of Repre-
sentatives unanimously, and the Senate with a clear 
majority of 97 votes to 2 – adopted their own (non-
 
Congressional Research Service [CRS], 7 August 2018), 2, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10942.pdf (accessed 24 Novem-
ber 2018). 
47 See United States Senate, Hearing to Receive Testimony on 
United States European Command. Stenographic Transcript (Wash-
ington, D.C., 23 March 2017), 49ff., https://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-24_03-23-17.pdf 
(accessed 20 May 2019). 
48 Quoted in Joe Gould, “Bill Would Make Pentagon Track 
Allied Defense Spending for Congress”, Defense News (online), 
12 July 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-
priorities/2018/07/12/bill-would-make-pentagon-track-allied-
defense-spending-for-congress/ (accessed 21 May 2019). 
49 See Niels Lesniewski, “Senate Plans to Revive NATO Ob-
server Group. Senate Organization First Developed in 1997 
Ahead of New NATO Admissions”, Roll Call (online), 28 Feb-
ruary 2018, https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/senate-
plans-revive-nato-observer-group (accessed 6 May 2019); “US 
Senate Revives NATO Observer Group”, NATO Watch (online), 
3 March 2018, http://natowatch.org/newsbriefs/2018/us-
senate-revives-nato-observer-group (accessed 6 May 2019). 
binding) resolutions expressing their support for the 
Atlantic Alliance.50 
After the mid-term elections to Congress in No-
vember 2018, which gave the Democrats a majority in 
the House of Representatives, there are no signs that 
cross-party solidarity with NATO is weakening. With 
a large majority of 357 votes in favour and 22 against, 
the new House of Representatives has passed a bill 
that excludes the use of budgetary resources to with-
draw from the Alliance.51 In the Senate, which re-
mains dominated by the Republicans, a group of sen-
ators from both parties introduced a law that provides 
for new sanctions against Russia, as well as high legis-
lative hurdles for a possible US withdrawal from 
NATO.52 The invitation to NATO Secretary General 
Jens Stoltenberg to address both chambers of the US 
Congress in April 2019 on the occasion of the 70th 
anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty 
also demonstrates the broad, cross-party support for 
the Alliance.53 
This does not mean that Congress views NATO 
wholly uncritically. Both senators and representatives 
keep calling for more balanced military burden-
sharing. Unlike Trump, however, they do not posit 
the issue of military burden-sharing as a condition for 
US security commitments. 
 
50 See Brett Samuels, “House Passes Resolution in Support 
of NATO by Unanimous Voice Vote”, in: The Hill (online), 
11 July 2018, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/396536-
house-passes-resolution-in-support-of-nato-by-unanimous-
voice-vote (accessed 6 May 2019); Avery Anapol, “Senate 
Votes to Support NATO ahead of Trump Summit”, The Hill 
(online), 10 July 2018, https://thehill.com/homenews/adminis 
tration/396399-senate-overwhelmingly-passes-resolution-
supporting-nato-as-trump (accessed 6 May 2019). 
51 See Gould, “US House Votes Overwhelmingly to Bar US 
Exit from NATO” (see note 26). 
52 See Jordain Carney, “Bipartisan Senators Reintroduce 
Legislation to Slap New Sanctions on Russia”, The Hill 
(online), 13 February 2019, https://thehill.com/homenews/ 
senate/429880-bipartisan-senators-reintroduce-legislation-to-
slap-new-sanctions-on-russia (accessed 6 May 2019). 
53 See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
NATO Secretary General Addresses Historic Joint Meeting of the 
United States Congress (Brussels, 3 April 2019), https://www. 
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_165249.htm (accessed 23 May 
2019). 
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Doubts about US Credibility 
Security and defence relations between the United 
States and its allies take place on several levels: 
between politicians, diplomats, military personnel, 
parliamentarians and civil-society representatives. 
Any perceptions of the credibility of security pledges 
are therefore not shaped by just one person. Yet the 
solid support for NATO in the administration and 
Congress cannot hide the fact that President Trump’s 
statements have raised serious doubts about these 
commitments. 
NATO enjoys broad, bi-partisan 
support in Congress. In the event of a 
crisis, however, the president is the 
one person who matters. 
In crisis situations, all essential security and defence 
decisions converge on the White House. Nevertheless, 
there are many indications that even during “normal 
functioning”, formal decision-making processes in the 
Trump administration can come to a standstill or can 
easily be circumvented by the president. Access to the 
president is made difficult for close advisors and even 
more so for senior officials. This became clear, for ex-
ample, at the first bilateral meeting between Trump 
and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in 
July 2018, when even close advisors remained in the 
dark about the content of the talks.54 The frequent 
changes in the Trump administration’s top personnel 
contribute to the uncertainty about the US’s direc-
tion. 
Congress’s most recent resolutions and draft laws 
have so far had a mainly symbolic significance. To 
actually tie the president’s hands, the bills would 
either have to be signed by the president himself or 
be put into effect with qualified majorities against 
the president’s veto – two highly unlikely scenarios. 
In the USA, the issue is also being discussed as to 
whether the president could withdraw from interna-
tional treaties and organisations such as NATO even 
against the express will of Congress.55 Another ques-
tion is whether Congress could prevent the president 
 
54 See Karen DeYoung et al., “As Russians Describe ‘Verbal 
Agreements’ at Summit, U.S. Officials Scramble for Clarity”, 
Washington Post (online), 19 July 2018. 
55 See Harold Hongju Koh, “Presidential Power to Termi-
nate International Agreements”, The Yale Law Journal Forum, 
no. 128 (2018). 
from recalling US troops from an allied state such as 
Germany or South Korea.56 Neither issue has been 
clarified from a legal point of view. However, they are 
ultimately of secondary importance for the credibility 
of America’s security pledges. Alliance commitments 
demanded by Congress which the president expressly 
does not want to keep would be of little value in the 
eyes of allies. 
At a minimum, however, the statements of support 
emanating from Congress signal to the President that 
he may have to pay a price if he fails to meet the 
security commitments made to America’s allies. In 
extreme cases, such failure could even cost him his 
re-election in November 2020. Such threats, however, 
would only be credible if the Republican Party were 
willing and able to enforce the expressions of solidari-
ty with NATO made by its Congressmen and women, 
especially in the event of a conflict with the presi-
dent. 
There is no doubt that Trump has challenged some 
of the traditional core positions of the Republican 
Party in trade, foreign and security policy. At the same 
time, however, domestically he has successfully 
pushed through a conservative agenda, in particular 
through his tax reform and his personnel decisions 
for the Supreme Court as well as federal courts.57 
Ultimately, domestic rather than foreign policy issues 
will decide Donald Trump’s political future. 
 
 
56 See Ashley Deeks, Can Congress Constitutionally Restrict the 
President’s Troop Withdrawals?, 6 February 2019, https://www. 
lawfareblog.com/can-congress-constitutionally-restrict-
presidents-troop-withdrawals (accessed 12 June 2019). 
57 See Bobby Jindal, “Why Republicans Stick With Trump”, 
Wall Street Journal, 30 August 2018, A15. 
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The second important criterion for assessing the 
credibility of US security commitments and US 
reassurance within NATO is, after domestic political 
conditions, the development of the European and 
international environment. Here, shifts in the mili-
tary balance of power play a key role. An historical 
example is NATO’s credibility crisis in the 1960s, 
which was brought about by a stalemate between 
Washington and Moscow on strategic nuclear weap-
ons,58 and by the perception of European NATO states 
that the Soviet Union was conventionally superior.59 
Even after the end of the Cold War, the military 
balance of power has by no means become irrelevant. 
It has an impact on the costs and risks associated with 
security commitments, on the effectiveness of deter-
rence, and on the likelihood of successful defence in 
a crisis or war. 
Troop Presence and Military Balance 
of Power 
After 1991, the importance of the US military pres-
ence in Europe for the credibility of its security com-
mitments declined. The ability to send military forces 
to crisis areas or to strengthen them there if necessary 
became the focus of attention.60 While more than 
400,000 US soldiers were permanently stationed in 
100 municipalities in Europe during the Cold War, by 
2016 this presence had been reduced by 85 percent 
 
58 For an explanation of this term, see note 4. 
59 See Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution. 
A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford, 1996), 388. 
60 See Gary L. Guertner, “Deterrence and Conventional 
Military Forces”, Small Wars & Insurgencies 11, no. 2 (2000): 
60–71 (66). 
(measured by the number of soldiers) and 75 percent 
(measured by the number of bases).61 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the issue of 
the credibility of US reassurance was pushed far into 
the background of European security policy. There 
were two main reasons for this: the military superior-
ity of the USA appeared so great in all conceivable 
scenarios that the issue simply no longer arose; and 
NATO’s collective defence fell off the agenda, de facto 
if not on paper (i.e. in the 1991 Strategic Concept). 
This was evident in the debates and decisions that 
led to the eastward expansion of the Alliance. They 
were dominated by political considerations and not 
by the question of how the accession countries could 
be defended militarily in the event of a conflict. This 
is particularly true of the 2004 enlargement round, in 
which the three Baltic republics as well as Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria joined the Alliance. 
As of 1993 the states which would later accede to 
the alliance, the “old” NATO states and Russia had 
already considerably reduced their conventional 
military potential.62 
Politically, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 
committed NATO to refrain from the “additional per-
manent stationing of substantial combat forces” in 
the accession states.63 The term “substantial combat 
forces” was not defined in the Founding Act, but an 
upper limit of a brigade (between 3,000 and 5,000 
soldiers) has at times been mentioned as a bench-
 
61 USEUCOM, U. S. Military Presence in Europe (1945–2016) 
(Stuttgart, 26 May 2016), 1, https://www.eucom.mil/doc/ 
35220/u-s-forces-in-europe (accessed 20 May 2019). 
62 For further details, see The Military Balance 117, no. 1 
(2017): 63–182 (67) (Chapter Four. Europe). 
63 NATO, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, 
France (Paris, 27 May 1997), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natohq/official_texts_25468.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed 
21 May 2019). 
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mark.64 Thus, in purely military terms, during the 
first decade and a half following the end of the Cold 
War, the Alliance considerably expanded its territory, 
especially its north-eastern and south-eastern “flanks”, 
and at the same time thinned out its conventional 
capabilities.65 
In direct comparison, NATO member states appear 
to have a much greater defence potential than Russia. 
Together, the allies generate a gross domestic product 
(GDP) of US$38 trillion (19 trillion of which is the 
United States),66 spend US$925 billion on defence 
(643 billion of which is the United States),67 and main-
tain 3.2 million soldiers (1.4 million of which is the 
United States) in armed forces, excluding reservists.68 
By contrast, Russia’s GDP is only US$1.5 trillion. 
The country’s defence spending is about US$45 bil-
lion, and the numerical strength of the armed forces 
is 900,000. However, comparisons in US$ must be 
viewed with a degree of caution as they do not take 
into account purchasing power parity: Russia essen-
tially covers its armaments needs from national 
sources and pays for them in roubles.69 
 
64 See Thomas Gutschker, “Die NATO muss schneller 
werden”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 15 July 2018, 
2; Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Deutschen Bundestages, 
Zulässigkeit rotierender Truppen in den östlichen Mitgliedstaaten der 
NATO, WD 2-3000-077/16/2016 (Berlin, 24 May 2016), 7, 
https://www.bundestag.de/blob/433612/086dbea48fe4aa67d52
2df6817d48470/wd-2-077-16-pdf-data.pdf (accessed 21 May 
2019). 
65 For a discussion on how this has had a negative impact 
on the credibility of US security commitments see Joshua 
Shifrinson, “Time to Consolidate NATO?”, in: The Washington 
Quarterly, 40 (2017) 1, p. 109-23 (110). 
66 The World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
(Washington, D.C.), https://databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed 
24 May 2019). The figures refer to the year 2017. 
67 Defence spending in current US$ “International Com-
parisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Personnel”, 
The Military Balance 119, no. 1 (2019): 513-18. The figures refer 
to 2018. 
68 Ibid; The Military Balance 119, no. 1 (2019): 21-27 (Chapter 
Two: Comparative Defence Statistics). The figures refer to 
2018. 
69 See Michael Kofman, “Russian Defense Spending Is 
Much Larger, and More Sustainable Than It Seems”, Defense 
News (online), 3 May 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/ 
opinion/commentary/2019/05/03/russian-defense-spending-is-
much-larger-and-more-sustainable-than-it-seems/ (accessed 
24 May 2019). 
More importantly, Russia would be superior to 
NATO in a regionally confined conflict in Eastern 
Europe or the Baltic, due to its military capabilities in 
the Baltic Sea, the enclave of Kaliningrad, Crimea and 
its western military district.70 Russia has invested 
heavily in the modernisation of its military in the 
past decade.71 Between 2011 and 2015, Russian mili-
tary spending (measured nominally in roubles) 
doubled, while as a share of GDP it rose from 3.37 
percent to 4.83 percent over the same period. In the 
following two years, however, Moscow’s military 
expenditure fell again.72 
A study by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) 
concluded as early as 2016 that the Russian armed 
forces had developed the capability to conduct major 
military operations outside the territory of the former 
Soviet Union.73 Since 2016, Moscow has also begun 
to strengthen its military presence along its western 
border, including the establishment of a permanent 
military infrastructure on the border with Ukraine.74 
Of particular importance to NATO are improve-
ments in Russia’s military capabilities that would 
make it more difficult for the Alliance to provide 
military assistance to exposed eastern member states 
in the event of a crisis.75 This especially applies to air 
defence, defence against ships, submarine warfare, 
and the ability to attack ground targets with ballistic 
missiles and cruise missiles. 
 
70 See The Military Balance 117, no. 1 (2017) (see note 62), 66. 
Specifically, the authors of the Military Balance speak of a 
“temporary conventional superiority” of Russia in certain 
geographical areas such as the Baltic States. 
71 See The Military Balance 117, no. 1 (2017): 183–236 (184) 
(Chapter Five. Russia and Eurasia). 
72 The Military Balance 119, no. 1 (2019): 166–221 (175) 
(Chapter Five. Russia and Eurasia). 
73 See Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016, 
ed. Gudrun Persson (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research 
Agency [FOI], December 2016), 3, https://www.foi.se/rest-
api/report/FOI-R--4326--SE (accessed 6 May 2019). 
74 See The Military Balance 117, no. 1 (2017) (see note 71), 
S. 184, 188; Keir Giles, Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Re-
armed Military (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 3 May 2017), 9, https://carnegieendow 
ment.org/files/5.4.2017_Keir_Giles_RussiaMilitary.pdf 
(accessed 21 May 2019). 
75 See Stephan Frühling and Guillaume Lasconjarias, 
“NATO, A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area-Denial] and the Kaliningrad 
Challenge”, Survival 58, no. 2 (2016): 95–116 (96). 
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In the recent past, Moscow has produced additional 
S-400 air defence systems76 and introduced them into 
the armed forces.77 The system was already stationed 
in Kaliningrad in February 2012.78 Russia also trans-
ferred Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad in October 
2016.79 This rocket is highly mobile, difficult to de-
stroy in-flight, very accurate and can be equipped 
with conventional as well as nuclear warheads.80 
How can the Alliance guarantee the 
indivisible security of its members? 
The Russian Navy’s increasing inventory of Kalibr 
cruise missiles has enabled the fleet to hit targets on 
land up to 2,000 km from the coast.81 NATO also 
accuses Russia of having developed a ground-based 
cruise missile based on the Kalibr, with a range of 
2,000 km and of already having stationed it at various 
locations in Russia. This cruise missile violated the 
 
76 The S400 system can be directed against manned and 
unmanned missiles as well as ballistic missiles and cruise 
missiles, and has a range of approximately 400 km. It can 
thus cover the airspace from Kaliningrad to Riga, Vilnius or 
Warsaw as well as parts of Estonia. 
77 See The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018): 169–218 (174) 
(Chapter Five. Russia and Eurasia). 
78 See “Russia Deploys S-400 Missile Defense in Kalinin-
grad”, Baltic News Network, 7 April 2012, https://bnn-
news.com/russia-deploys-s-400-missile-defense-kaliningrad-
57349 (accessed 6 May 2019); Gareth Davies, Infomap. In Strike 
Range: Russian Weapon Systems in Kaliningrad (London, March 
2017), https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kalinin 
grad_from_boomtown_to_battle_station_7256 (accessed 
21 May 2019). 
79 Initially, the installation was only temporary as part of 
training exercises, but it has subsequently been made per-
manent. See “Russland bestätigt Iskander-Raketen in Kalinin-
grad”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (online), 4 May 2018, 
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/nach-langer-
geheimhaltung-russland-bestaetigt-iskander-raketen-in-
kaliningrad-15574438.html (accessed 6 May 2019). The 
Iskander-M has a maximum range of 500 km and could thus 
reach Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius, Warsaw or Berlin. See Davies, 
Infomap (see note 78); Ian Williams, CSIS [Center for Strategic 
and International Studies] Missile Defense Project. The Russia-NATO 
A2AD Environment (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 3 January 2017), 
https://missilethreat.csis.org/russia-nato-a2ad-environment/ 
(accessed 6 May 2019). 
80 See CSIS, SS-26 (Iskander) (Washington, D.C., 13 May 
2019), https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-26/ (accessed 
21 May 2019). 
81 The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018) (see note 77), 174. 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Both sea- 
and land-based weapons can be equipped with con-
ventional and nuclear warheads.82 
Since 2014 the perception of a regional military 
imbalance in North-Eastern Europe to the detriment 
of NATO has intensified the debate in the Alliance 
on strengthening reassurance and deterrence. In this 
debate, publications by leading U.S. think tanks, 
whose authors advocate the expansion of U.S. and 
NATO military presence in eastern allied countries, 
also play an important role.83 Two studies by the 
RAND Corporation on the impact of these imbalances 
on the Alliance’s collective defence capabilities have 
made waves in Washington and other NATO capitals. 
In the first study of 2016, the authors concluded on 
the basis of “war games” (i.e. simulations) that Rus-
sian armed forces would need no more than 60 hours 
to reach Tallinn or Riga.84 They propose that the NATO 
states provide seven combat brigades, at least three 
of them equipped with tanks, for the defence of the 
Baltic states.85 According to the authors, these forces 
would be sufficient to deny Russia the possibility of 
creating military facts that are difficult to alter. The 
second, more recent, study (2018) also concludes that 
the Atlantic Alliance would be “badly outnumbered 
and outgunned” in the first days of an armed con-
flict.86 
The authors also stress that the Alliance’s ability 
to command sufficient reinforcements at a later date 
 
82 See The Military Balance 119, no. 1 (2019) (see note 72), 
174. 
83 These authors are frequently ex-military or former 
members of the US administration. See, e.g., Billy Fabian, 
Mark Gunzinger, Jan van Tol, Jacob Cohn and Gillian Evans, 
Strengthening the Defense of NATO’s Eastern Frontier (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments [CSBA], 
13 March 2019), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/ 
strengthening-the-defense-of-natos-eastern-frontier (accessed 
24 May 2019); Alexander R. Vershbow and Philip M. Breed-
love, Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the US Military 
Presence in North Central Europe (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic 
Council, February 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ 
publications/reports/permanent-deterrence (accessed 24 May 
2019). 
84 See Shlapak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence (see 
note 18), 1. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance 
in Europe. Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority, 
Research Report (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2018), 8, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_report
s/RR2400/RR2402/RAND_RR2402.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019). 
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is questionable. Even the most militarily powerful 
European NATO states – France, Great Britain and 
Germany – could only mobilise one armoured 
combat brigade at a time, and within one or two 
months.87 Finally, the RAND authors take a sceptical 
view of the United States’ ability to send sufficient 
troops and material across the Atlantic.88 
Given the military balance of power on NATO’s 
north-eastern and eastern borders as described above 
– and despite NATO’s global conventional superior-
ity – the familiar issue now arises with renewed 
urgency: how can the Alliance credibly provide for 
the indivisibility of member-state security, which it 
postulates politically? 
Nuclear Weapons 
Since 1991, both the United States and NATO have 
considered the threat from other nuclear powers to be 
relatively low. They have concentrated instead on the 
risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and nuclear terrorism. The USA and the Soviet Union/ 
Russia have both significantly reduced their numbers 
of non-strategic nuclear weapons, in the case of the 
USA to an estimated 500 by the beginning of the 
2000s.89 In its 2010 nuclear strategy, the Obama ad-
ministration also still assumed that America’s nuclear 
weapons would play a less important role in defence 
policy, since the security environment had improved 
due to the fact that the USA was conventionally supe-
rior to potential opponents and had made progress 
in missile defence.90 
This optimistic picture has now worsened dramati-
cally, and not only in the USA. Technological changes 
have fuelled the fears of nuclear-weapon states that 
 
87 By 2023 the German Ministry of Defence aims to be 
able to fully equip a tank brigade and make it operational, 
without it having to borrow material from other parts of 
the Bundeswehr. See Gutschker, “Die NATO muss schneller 
werden” (see note 64). 
88 See Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance 
(see note 86), 10f. 
89 Von Hlatky, “American Alliances and Extended Deter-
rence” (see note 5), 7f. 
90 See DoD, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C., 
April 2010), https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/ 
defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report. 
pdf (accessed 21 May 2019). 
they could lose their second strike capability 91 as 
increasingly precise missiles and cruise missiles 
threaten their nuclear arsenals. This also blurs the 
boundaries between nuclear and conventional risks. 
Nuclear weapons are once again viewed as a symbol 
of strength. Nuclear arms control is in danger of 
collapsing, as the end of the INF Treaty testifies.92 
Russia, like the United States, is undertaking a 
comprehensive modernisation programme of its 
nuclear arsenal. With regard to strategic weapons, 
which have an intercontinental range due to their 
delivery systems, both states continue to maintain a 
numerical equilibrium laid down in the 2010 New 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty) of 
1,550 warheads each. However, this treaty expires in 
2021, and it is questionable whether Moscow and 
Washington will be able to agree on its extension. 
Much more ambiguous is the situation with so-
called non-strategic or tactical weapons, which are 
not mounted on intercontinental missiles, long-range 
bombers or nuclear submarines, and thus do not 
fall under the existing arms control agreements for 
strategic weapons. 
The US and NATO feel threatened by what they see 
as a significant imbalance in non-strategic weapons, 
since Russia maintains a considerably larger arsenal 
of these than the Alliance.93 Russia has about 1,800 
such weapons, which are assigned to the various 
branches of the armed forces.94 It considers them 
compensation for the conventional superiority of the 
US and its NATO allies and a counterweight to China’s 
increasingly capable conventional armed forces.95 
Especially from the perspective of NATO states in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, the modernisation of Russia’s 
nuclear-capable short-range missiles through the 
 
91 “Secure second strike capability” refers to the capability 
of a nuclear-weapons state to retaliate with nuclear weapons 
in the event of a nuclear atack on its territoy. 
92 See Oliver Thränert, “Tiefe Krise der atomaren Rüstung-
skontrolle. Ein Erfolgsrezept aus dem Kalten Krieg ist zu 
Unrecht in Vergessenheit geraten”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
30 October 2018. 
93 See DoD, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2010 (see note 90), 
27. 
94 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian 
Nuclear Forces, 2018”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 3 
(2018): 185–95 (191). 
95 Ibid., 190. 
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introduction of the SS-26 (Iskander-M)96 is highly 
problematic. 
According to Washington and NATO,97 Russia is 
pursuing an increasingly aggressive defence policy 
that has significantly raised the profile of nuclear 
weapons. The modernisation and expansion of its 
arsenal,98 its increase in military exercises with nucle-
ar weapons-capable systems,99 and its threats of pos-
sibly using nuclear weapons100 have sparked a debate 
about its intentions and nuclear strategy.101 
The latter is often discussed under the term “esca-
late to de-escalate”. According to American nuclear 
planners, Russia is threatening a limited nuclear esca-
lation – the use of short and medium-range nuclear 
weapons of lower yield – to put an end to any re-
gional conflict on its own terms. They believe this 
threat to be based on the assumption that neither the 
USA nor NATO would risk a further escalation with 
Russia to the point of a comprehensive nuclear war 
and would capitulate instead.102 The Trump admin-
istration uses this viewpoint also as justification to 
 
96 On the modernisation of Russian nuclear short-range 
missiles, see ibid., 192. 
97 In its final declaration at the Brussels Summit in July 
2018, NATO condemned Russia’s “irresponsible and aggres-
sive nuclear rhetoric”: NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration. 
Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the 
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels (Brussels, 11–12 
July 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natohq/official_texts_156624.htm (accessed 21 May 2019). 
98 The US is focusing especially on the modernisation of 
non-strategic weapons that Russia can deploy with air-to-
ground missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, bombers, 
ships and submarines. See DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018 
(see note 39), 52. 
99 See Jakob Hedenskog et al., “Russian Security Policy”, in 
Russian Military Capability, ed. Persson (see note 73), 97–132 
(111). 
100 A frequently cited, albeit older, example is the threat 
made by the then Russian ambassador to Denmark, Mikhail 
Vanin, in spring 2015, that Danish warships would become 
the target of Russian nuclear weapons if they joined NATO’s 
missile defence. See Teis Jensen, Adrian Croft and Peter 
Graff, “Russia Threatens to Aim Nuclear Missiles at Denmark 
Ships If It Joins NATO Shield”, Reuters (online), 22 March 
2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-denmark-
russia/russia-threatens-to-aim-nuclear-missiles-at-denmark-
ships-if-it-joins-nato-shield-idUSKBN0MI0ML20150322 
(accessed 7 May 2019). 
101 See Kristensen and Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 
2018” (see note 94), 185. 
102 See DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018 (see note 39), 30. 
Congress for the development of nuclear weapons with 
lower yield. 
However, even Western experts on nuclear issues 
and on Russia take a somewhat critical view of these 
perceptions and assumptions about Russia’s nuclear 
weapons policy. They point out that there is no offi-
cial Russian “escalate/de-escalate” doctrine and that 
the current Russian military doctrine of 2014 only 
provides for the use of nuclear weapons if Russia it-
self is attacked with weapons of mass destruction, or 
if the survival of the state is at stake.103 
Another criticism made of the prevailing American 
view is that Russian exercises with nuclear-capable 
weapons systems are equated with nuclear exercises. 
Moreover, Kristin ven Bruusgaard believes that Russia 
does not propagate a lower operational threshold for 
the use of nuclear weapons simply because the devel-
opment of state-of-the-art conventional capabilities 
in recent years has given it sufficient alternatives for 
dealing with regional conflicts.104 Nevertheless, Russia 
deliberately spreads ambivalent messages about the 
role of its nuclear weapons, and the statements of 
individual representatives of the Russian state seem 
to go beyond official Russian military doctrine.105 
The deterioration of the security environment and 
the renaissance of nuclear weapons have given new 
weight to US assurances within NATO. At the same 
time, the regional imbalances in conventional and 
nuclear weapons have raised the question of whether, 
in this changed security environment, the current 
military underpinning of these commitments is still 
sufficient. 
 
 
103 See Bruno Tertrais, “Russia’s Nuclear Policy. Worrying 
for the Wrong Reasons”, Survival 60, no. 2 (2018): 33–44 
(37). 
104 See Kristin ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of Russia’s 
Lowered Nuclear Threshold”, War on the Rocks (online), 
22 September 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-
myth-of-russias-lowered-nuclear-threshold/ (accessed 7 May 
2019). 
105 For a corresponding assessment, see Kristensen and 
Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2018” (see note 94), 187. 
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After the domestic support and the regional security 
environment, specific financial, military and opera-
tional contributions to European security are the 
third factor underpinning the credibility of its NATO 
commitments. The larger these contributions are, and 
the more specifically tailored to the changed security 
environment, the more credible security reassurances 
are. 
Reassurance after Russia’s Annexation 
of Crimea 
The number of American troops in Europe has fluctu-
ated in recent years, but overall has slightly increased: 
in 2013 (i.e. before the annexation of Crimea) there 
were still around 70,200 US-soldiers, falling to 67,300 
in 2016 and then rising again to just over 73,000 in 
2018.106 What is clear is that the long-term trend of 
withdrawing American troops from Europe, which 
began in the mid-1980s, has come to an end. 
This is largely due to the fact that since 2014 the 
USA has been building up and expanding its military 
presence in the eastern NATO states in response to 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In 2018 there were 
approximately 2,800 US soldiers in Poland; 1,150 
in Romania; and Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia had 
smaller contingents. In 2013 the USA had not yet 
 
106 The Military Balance 114, no. 1 (2014): 31-58 (54ff.) 
(Chapter Three: North America); The Military Balance 119, 
no. 1 (2019): 28-65 (59ff. ) (Chapter Three: North America); 
The Military Balance 117, no. 1 (2017) 1, p. 27-62 (58ff.) (Chap-
ter Three: North America). The data refer to “deployments”, 
in which the authors of Military Balance include both perma-
nently stationed troops and operational deployments. The 
numbers include US presence in all European countries, in-
cluding non-NATO countries such as the Ukraine. The 
presence of the USA in Israel was not counted, although the 
country belongs to the area of operation of the European 
Command of the USA (EUCOM). 
stationed troops in any of these countries.107 More-
over, Washington announced in September 2018 that 
it would send a further 1,500 soldiers to Germany by 
2020, in addition to the approximately 38,000 already 
stationed there.108 
Since the annexation of Crimea in 
2014, the USA has expanded its 
military presence in the eastern 
NATO region, focusing on Poland. 
In June 2014, the Obama administration created a 
specific financial instrument – the European Reassur-
ance Initiative (ERI) – to expand US military contribu-
tions to reassurance in Europe and to increase the 
operational readiness of US troops there. Since then, 
the financial resources of the instrument have been 
significantly expanded with bi-partisan support in 
Congress: from an initial US$985 million in 2015 to 
US$6.5 billion in 2019.109 The most recent draft bud-
get, presented by President Trump for the 2020 finan-
cial year, provides for a slight reduction in resources 
 
107 The Military Balance 114, no. 1 (2014) (see note 106), 
S. 54ff; The Military Balance 119, no. 1 (2019) (see note 106), 
59ff. 
108 “Amerika verlegt zusätzliche Soldaten nach Deutsch-
land”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (online), 7 September 
2018, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/amerika-
verlegt-zusaetzliche-soldaten-nach-deutschland-
15776749.html (accessed 23 May 2019). 
109 USEUCOM, 2018 European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) 
Fact Sheet (Stuttgart, 28 June 2017); Pat Towell and Aras D. 
Kazlauskas, The European Deterrence Initiative [EDI]: A Budgetary 
Overview, CRS In Focus (Washington, D.C.: CRS, 8 August 
2018), 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10946.pdf (accessed 23 
May 2019); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comp-
troller), European Deterrence Initiative. Department of Defense 
Budget Fiscal Year 2020 (Washington, D.C., March 2019), 17, 
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbud
get/fy2020/fy2020_EDI_JBook.pdf (accessed 25 May 2019). 
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for the first time, to US$5.9 billion,110 which it justi-
fied by the completion of infrastructure projects. 
The ERI, which has since been renamed the Euro-
pean Deterrence Initiative (EDI), is not intended to in-
crease the number of US troops already permanently 
stationed in Europe. It concerns soldiers who are ad-
ditionally transferred from the USA to Europe for a 
limited time. Accordingly, the “core” of the presence 
strengthened in the course of reassurance is a brigade 
equipped with tanks (approximately 3,000-3,500 sol-
diers, 80-90 battle tanks and other equipment), which 
“rotates” from the USA to Europe for nine months 
before being ordered back to the USA to be replaced 
by a new brigade.111 The brigade’s headquarters, other 
troops and material are located in Poland; other com-
ponents are in Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.112 
From there, soldiers of the brigade will be deployed to 
the Baltic States for short periods for joint exercises. 
The USA has increased the number of combat 
aviation aircraft in Germany by one brigade since the 
beginning of 2017, also on the rotation principle. 
It is equipped with military helicopters for combat, 
reconnaissance and transport.113 In both cases – the 
armoured brigade and the aviation brigade – the 
goal is to establish a virtually continuous American 
presence through the complete rotation of troops, 
even though soldiers and their families are not de-
tached to Europe for long periods of time. Donald 
Trump’s EDI budget proposal for 2020 provides for a 
total of up to 9,400 US soldiers to be sent to Europe 
under the rotation model to complement the units 
already permanently stationed there.114 
 
110 USEUCOM, FY 2020 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) 
Fact Sheet (Stuttgart, March 2019). 
111 U.S. Army Europe, Atlantic Resolve Fact Sheet (Wiesbaden, 
6 June 2018), https://www.eur.army.mil/Newsroom/Fact-
Sheets-Infographics/Fact-Sheet-Article-View/Article/1451471/ 
atlantic-resolve-fact-sheet/ (accessed 20 May 2019). The US-
based Army Brigade, which was transferred to Europe for 
nine months, complements the two brigades stationed 
permanently in Germany and Italy, so that a total of three 
are now located in Europe. 
112 See U. S. Army Europe, Fact Sheet: Atlantic Resolve Armored 
Rotation (Wiesbaden, 11 January 2019), https://www.eur. 
army.mil/Portals/19/documents/Fact%20Sheets/1IDArmor 
RotationFactSheet.pdf (accessed 20 May 2019). 
113 See U.S. Army Europe, Atlantic Resolve Fact Sheet (see 
note 111). 
114 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
European Deterrence Initiative, 2019 (see note 109), 1. 
The EDI funds will also be used to finance the 
storage of part of the necessary army equipment and 
weaponry in Europe so that it does not have to be 
brought in from the USA in the event of a crisis. The 
US objective is to have sufficient equipment and am-
munition in stock for an armoured army division by 
2021. This material is stored at locations in Germany, 
Belgium, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands.115 
Funds are also made available for joint exercises, 
expanding military infrastructure, and expanding the 
capacities of allied armed forces.116 Military support 
for Ukraine, which is controversial among NATO 
states, is also financed from the EDI budget to the 
sum of US$250 million per annum.117 
US military contributions to reassurance in Europe 
are both based on bilateral agreements with the coun-
tries concerned and closely integrated into NATO’s 
multinational context. They aim to support the plans 
and measures adopted and implemented by the 
Alliance at its summits in Wales (2014), Warsaw 
(2016) and Brussels (2018).118 
For example, the USA leads one of the four multi-
national combat groups of the Enhanced Forward 
Presence (EFP), which are stationed in the Baltic re-
publics and in Poland. The United States is the EFP 
lead nation in Poland and participates with 889 sol-
diers; the other contributing states to the NATO 
battle group are the United Kingdom, Romania and 
Croatia.119 The USA also supports the Alliance’s 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in exercises.120 
 
115 See U. S. Army Europe, Fact Sheet. Army Prepositioned 
Stock (Wiesbaden, 13 September 2018), https://www.eur. 
army.mil/Portals/19/documents/FactSheets/APSFactSheet.pdf 
(accessed 20 May 2019). 
116 See USEUCOM, 2018 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) 
Fact Sheet (Stuttgart, 2 October 2017). 
117 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptrol-
ler)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Budget Overview. Fiscal 
Year 2020 Budget Request (Washington, D.C., 2019), 6–8, 
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbud
get/fy2020/fy2020_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf 
(accessed 23 May 2019). 
118 For an overview of NATO decisions since 2014, see 
Table 7 “NATO transformation 2014-19”; The Military Balance 
119, no. 1 (2019): 66-165 (70-71) (Chapter Four: Europe). 
119 NATO, NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (Brussels, 
February 2019), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ 
assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/20190213_1902-factsheet_efp_en.pdf 
(accessed 12 June 2019). 
120 See USEUCOM, 2019 European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) 
Fact Sheet (Stuttgart, 2019), https://www.eucom.mil/media-
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The fact that Washington expects additional Euro-
pean efforts in return for these contributions is 
demonstrated by the NATO Readiness Initiative, which 
the Alliance adopted in June 2018 on the initiative 
of the United States. According to the plan, NATO 
states will together be able to make 30 army battal-
ions, 30 flying squadrons and 30 combat ships ready 
for action within 30 days. This goal is to be achieved 
by 2020 to improve the operational readiness of 
existing national armed forces.121 
US financial and military contributions since 2015 
are not only relevant to the size of its presence in 
Europe. They have a specific qualitative dimension too. 
The Anti-Access/Area-Denial threat (A2/AD), meaning 
Russia’s ability to make NATO’s access to the more 
exposed eastern allies difficult or even impossible in 
the event of a conflict, points to the importance of 
the specific capabilities of the air force and navy.122 
The European NATO states remain 
highly dependent on the US in key 
military areas, such as air defence. 
The USA has started to use ERI/EDI funds to devel-
op the air force infrastructure in the Baltic States and 
Poland for joint use with the host country. This in-
cludes investments in airfields and materiel depots.123 
The temporary dispatch of US fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft to Europe was also highly symbolic and visible. 
This generation of jets, which includes the F22- and 
F-35, is of great significance because, in the event of a 
conflict, its special camouflage and electronic charac-
teristics would be relied on to penetrate Russia’s 
increasingly capable air defence system. The USA is 
 
library/document/36242/2019-edi-fact-sheet (accessed 23 May 
2019). 
121 See The Military Balance 119, no. 1 (2019) (see note 118), 
69. 
122 See Frühling and Lasconjarias, “NATO, A2/AD and the 
Kaliningrad Challenge” (see note 75), 109. 
123 See John Vandiver, “USAFE [U. S. Air Forces in Europe] 
Chief: Military Doing ‘360-degree’ Review of Basing in 
Europe”, Stars & Stripes (online), 25 July 2018, https://www. 
stripes.com/news/usafe-chief-military-doing-360-degree-
review-of-basing-in-europe-1.539414 (accessed 7 May 2019). 
One of the locations is the Estonian air force base Ämari. See 
Evan Parker, USAFE Celebrates First Completed EDI-Funded Project 
(U.S. Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa, 19 October 
2018), https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/ 
1665483/usafe-celebrates-first-completed-edi-funded-project/ 
(accessed 23 May 2019). 
planning the first permanent stationing of F-35 in 
Europe for 2021. The location will be the British Air 
Force base Lakenheath.124 
In this military sector of modern combat aircraft, 
European NATO states for the time being remain 
highly dependent on the USA and its technology, 
especially while their own European projects – the 
British Tempest and the Franco-German Future Combat 
Air System – are still in their infancy. From 2015 to 
2017, the US Air Force sent F-22 jets annually to 
Germany and Great Britain for manoeuvres; they 
were also used in exercises in Estonia, Poland, 
Lithuania and Romania.125 
Another important area of US reassurance in Eu-
rope concerns the maritime component, specifically 
warfare against submarines. The US military is wor-
ried about the modernisation of Russian submarines 
and increased Russian submarine activities, which 
has not existed at this level since the 1980s, according 
to the Chief of the US European Command.126 The 
US President most recently requested US$343 million 
to combat submarine threats (Theatre Anti-Submarine 
Warfare) as part of the EDI.127 
US Security Commitments and 
Hybrid Threats 
Since the deterioration of relations with Russia, NATO 
has been increasingly concerned with hybrid threats. 
These threats are essentially scenarios which are char-
acterized by “the use of military and nonmilitary 
tools in an integrated campaign”.128 Although this 
form of warfare is by no means new, its technological 
potential has multiplied in recent years. Hybrid war-
 
124 See William Howard, “Crews at RAF [Royal Air Force] 
Lakenheath Clear the Way for First Permanent US F-35 Jet 
Campus in Europe”, Stars & Stripes (online), 21 March 2019, 
https://www.stripes.com/news/crews-at-raf-lakenheath-clear-
the-way-for-first-permanent-us-f-35-jet-campus-in-europe-
1.573635 (accessed 7 May 2019). 
125 See Richard Komurek, F-22 Raptors Deploy to Europe 
(Ramstein Air Base, 20 October 2017), https://www.usafe. 
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1348765/f-22-raptors-
deploy-to-europe/ (accessed 23 May 2019). 
126 See USEUCOM, House Armed Services Committee Hearing 
(see note 35). 
127 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
European Deterrence Initiative, 2019 (see note 109), 18. 
128 The Military Balance 115, no. 1 (2015): 17–20 (17) 
(Hybrid Warfare: Challenge and Response). 
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fare is not only directed against the opponent’s regu-
lar armed forces, but is also aimed at influencing 
domestic policy and domestic power struggles in the 
target state.129 
Hybrid threats pose two key problems for the credi-
bility of security reassurances. First, the question 
arises as to whether states and alliances such as NATO 
have effective means and capabilities to counter the 
non-military components of the threat. The activities 
carried out by the USA in the ERI/EDI and EFP frame-
works are hardly suited to combating cyber attacks, 
and dealing with disinformation campaigns as well as 
other means of political subversion.130 
Beyond military instruments, the security policy 
and administrative structures in the USA have so far 
been insufficiently geared to dealing with hybrid 
threats. The former commander of the US European 
Command, General Scaparrotti, had already pointed 
out the existing deficits during a Congressional hear-
ing in 2017. It is true that new structures have been 
created in Washington to better withstand hybrid 
threats from Russia. These include the Russia Informa-
tion Group and the Global Engagement Center, which 
work under the auspices of the State Department. 
According to Scaparrotti, however, these structures 
lack political leadership and resources.131 
Second, the hybrid nature of a threat renders poli-
tical consensus difficult to achieve, especially in a 
multinational alliance context. Hybrid attacks on a 
NATO state cannot be identified as clearly or as early 
as conventional military strikes. The scenario of a 
 
129 See Andrew Radin, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics. Threats 
and Potential Responses (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 
2017), 6, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
ubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf 
(accessed 23 May 2019). 
130 See John R. Deni, “NATO’s Presence in the East: 
Necessary but Still Not Sufficient”, War on the Rocks (online), 
27 June 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/natos-
presence-in-the-east-necessary-but-still-not-sufficient/ 
(accessed 7 May 2019). The EDI’s draft budget for 2019 
provides resources to the amount of US$10 million for 
“information operations”. However, the EDI’s focus is on 
classical conventional reassurance. See Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), European Deterrence Initia-
tive. Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year 2019 (Washington, 
D.C., February 2018), 3, https://comptroller.defense. 
gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2019/fy2019_EDI_ 
JBook.pdf (accessed 12 June 2019). 
131 See United States Senate, Hearing to Receive Testimony 
(see note 47), 21. 
hybrid attack leaves much more room for different 
political interpretations as to whether or not the 
threshold of escalation has been exceeded to the ex-
tent that it triggers the defence clause under Article 5 
of the NATO Treaty. 
The power struggle in Washington 
over Trump’s contacts with Russia 
has damaged the credibility of 
American security policy. 
In terms of US security policy, President Trump 
was very vulnerable for some time to the accusation 
of collusion with Moscow in connection with the 
2016 US presidential and congressional elections. It 
was not until the investigations were concluded in 
March 2019 that, from Trump’s perspective, the situa-
tion eased, since special investigator Robert Mueller 
found no evidence to support the accusation of col-
lusion with Russia. 
Trump did not shy away from attacking and sys-
tematically discrediting the US intelligence agencies 
in his defence against this domestic political danger. 
Yet confidence in the information of one’s own intel-
ligence services is an essential foundation for count-
ering the dangers of disinformation and subversion 
in the context of hybrid warfare.132 The domestic 
power struggle in Washington over Russia’s interfer-
ence in the US elections has therefore also damaged 
the credibility of American policy in dealing with 
such threats. 
Extended Nuclear Deterrence 
US nuclear weapon doctrines under Obama and 
Trump fundamentally differ in their underlying per-
spective on the international security environment. 
While the former still assumed a relatively favourable 
environment for the USA, the latter sees conflicts and 
competitors virtually everywhere who want to chal-
lenge the USA, politically and militarily. 
The Trump administration thus estimates the sig-
nificance of nuclear weapons in US defence policy to 
be substantially higher than the Obama administra-
tion. At the same time, nuclear arms control plays a 
much smaller role for the Trump administration than 
the predecessor. It justifies this by asserting that other 
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18. 
US Military Contributions 
SWP Berlin 
A Matter of Credibility 
August 2019 
26 
nuclear powers – first and foremost Russia and 
China – are modernising and expanding their arse-
nals, whereas the USA has reduced its weapons stock 
by more than 85 percent since the height of the Cold 
War.133 
In terms of the importance of extended deterrence 
and nuclear reassurance for allies, however, there is 
more continuity between the two administrations. 
From NATO’s point of view, “The strategic forces of 
the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, 
are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies.”134 
Consequently, these weapons serve to protect not 
only America, but also its allies. The Trump admin-
istration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reinforces this 
political commitment. 
The Obama administration had already initiated 
an extensive programme to modernise the so-called 
nuclear “triad,” which has been continued under the 
Trump presidency. It includes the development of 
new submarines (Columbia class), new intercontinental 
missiles and a new long-range bomber (B-21 Raider).135 
Previous debates on the nuclear weapons policy of 
the USA in NATO mostly revolved around the 150 to 
200 non-strategic type B-61 drop bombs still stationed 
in Europe. These are stored in five countries (Germa-
ny, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey) and 
would, in the event of war, also be conveyed to their 
targets by aircraft from the stationing countries as 
part of nuclear sharing. Other NATO countries, such 
as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Roma-
nia, are making non-nuclear contributions to exer-
cises designed to prepare for such a scenario.136 
Here, too, the USA pursues the same course under 
Trump as previous administrations, maintaining the 
presence of B-61 bombs in Europe, but also continuing 
the programme of modernizing these weapons. A 
new version of this bomb – more accurate and with 
variable explosive yield – should be available by 
2021.137 
Unlike Obama’s nuclear strategy, however, Trump’s 
focuses on making the US nuclear capability more 
 
133 DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018 (see note 39), V. 
134 NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, 2018 (see note 97). 
135 See DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018 (see note 39), 48ff. 
136 As part of the so-called SNOWCAT-Mission: Support of 
Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics. See Hans 
M. Kristensen, NATO Nuclear Exercise Underway With Czech and 
Polish Participation (Washington, D. C.: Federation of American 
Scientists, 17 October 2017), https://fas.org/blogs/security/ 
2017/10/steadfast-noon-exercise/ (accessed 23 May 2019). 
137 See DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018 (see note 39), 48. 
flexible. According to the justification in the 2018 
NPR, the US President needs a spectrum of “limited 
and graduated options, including a variety of delivery 
systems and explosive yields”138 to deter a nuclear or 
“non-nuclear strategic” attack. This requirement is 
also directly related to US security commitments to 
its allies. Washington could credibly deter a nuclear 
attack on the territory of the USA with its existing 
strategic arsenal. According to the NPR, making the 
nuclear options more flexible would therefore 
primarily serve as a deterrent in regional crises in 
Europe or Asia. 
Specifically, this is to be achieved through three 
supplements to the strategic “triad”. First, the capability 
for deploying nuclear-capable aircraft is to be main-
tained and, if necessary, expanded, inter alia through 
the introduction of the F-35 fighter jet and corre-
sponding contributions from NATO partners. Second, 
an unspecified number of sea-based ballistic missiles 
will be modified with low yield warheads and, third, a 
new sea-based cruise missile will be developed (whose 
predecessor Obama had abolished).139 
The assumption in the 2018 NPR is that these new 
options would make a catastrophic conflict less likely 
because they would increase deterrence.140 At the 
same time, US nuclear planners see flexible options as 
a way of limiting damage for the US and its allies in 
the event that deterrence fails nonetheless.141 Critics, 
on the other hand, warn against planning for nuclear 
warfare based on what they consider to be the mis-
taken assumption that the use of nuclear weapons is 
“possible and controllable below the threshold of 
strategic destruction risk”.142 
The possible solutions endorsed by the Trump ad-
ministration in its 2018 NPR to make nuclear options 
more flexible were specifically designed not to violate 
the INF Treaty. This agreement between Russia and 
the USA prohibited the testing, possession and sta-
tioning of land-based shorter and medium-range mis-
siles and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 
5,500 km. In October 2018, President Trump respond-
 
138 Ibid, 31. 
139 Ibid., 52ff. 
140 Ibid., 54. 
141 Ibid., 23. 
142 Wolfgang Richter, Erneuerung der nuklearen Abschreckung. 
Die USA wollen nukleare Einsatzoptionen und globale Eskalations-
dominanz stärken, SWP-Aktuell 15/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2018), 6, https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2018A15_ 
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ed to the Russian violation of this bilateral treaty by 
announcing the US’s withdrawal from it. This an-
nouncement was finally executed on August 2, 2019, 
thus ending the INF Treaty. There has been specula-
tion among European NATO states as to whether 
Washington also intends to station medium-range 
missiles in Europe in the future. When President 
Trump announced his intention to leave the INF 
Treaty, he threatened to develop these weapons.143 
For the time being, Washington has 
no intention of stationing any new 
nuclear weapons in Europe after the 
end of the INF Treaty. 
In fact, the US Department of Defense has been 
working on such options since at least 2013, and Con-
gress has provided the necessary funds in the past.144 
The 2018 NPR also officially confirms that the USA 
has already begun initial research and development 
work on new land-based medium-range missile 
systems.145 The development of these weapons (as 
opposed to their testing) was not prohibited by the 
INF Treaty. 
In early 2019, the American NATO ambassador Kay 
Bailey Hutchison let it be known that the USA does 
not intend to bring land-based nuclear missiles to 
Europe.146 Under the 2018 NPR, the Trump admin-
 
143 See Megan Keller, “Russian Official: Trump With-
drawal from Arms Control Treaty Form of ‘Blackmail’”, 
The Hill (online), 21 October 2018, 
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(accessed 7 May 2019). 
144 See Karoun Demirjian, “GOP Lawmakers Criticize 
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Washington Post (online), 21 October 2018. In 2017, Republi-
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gress (2017-2018): Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
Preservation Act of 2017 (Washington, D.C., 16 February 2017), 
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(accessed 23 May 2019). 
145 See DoD, Nuclear Posture Review, 2018 (see note 39), 10. 
146 See Thomas Gutschker, “Amerika plant kein Wett-
rüsten”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 10 February 
2019. 
istration instead relies on sea-launched missiles or 
cruise missiles for regional deterrence. 
Overall, during Trump’s presidency the US has 
increased its financial, military and operational con-
tributions to underpinning conventional and nuclear 
security commitments to European NATO countries. 
The contributions have specifically taken into account 
the military imbalances and vulnerabilities that have 
unsettled some allies, particularly those in Eastern 
Europe, since 2014. The USA has expanded its military 
presence in the eastern alliance area and increased its 
air defence and anti-submarine capabilities. Among 
NATO states, however, very different assessments per-
sist of what would actually be conducive to European 
security: whether, for example, it would be suitable 
to permanently deploy more US or NATO troops to 
the eastern member states and/or expand the nuclear 
options, as discussed above. 
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The three factors examined in this study, which form 
the basis for the credibility of conventional and nucle-
ar reassurance by the USA, are assessed and weighted 
differently among allies. Respective risk and threat 
perceptions are a major reason for these diverging 
views.147 This is illustrated below by a number of east-
ern allies who feel particularly exposed to Russia’s 
threats. 
Conventional Reassurance 
The distinction between US troops permanently 
stationed in Europe and those that “rotate perma-
nently” may be of secondary importance in terms of 
deterrence – where the addressee is Russia – but 
from the point of view of reassurance it is politically 
relevant for some eastern NATO countries. 
For many years (i.e. not only since either Donald 
Trump or the right-wing government in Warsaw took 
office), Poland has been pushing for US troops to be 
permanently stationed on its territory. In spring 2018, 
the Polish Ministry of Defence presented a proposal to 
station a whole US division in Poland. In return, War-
saw offered Washington substantial funds to finance 
this presence: US$1.5 to US$2 billion have been men-
tioned in this context.148 
 
147 The different national perspectives on the USA can also 
be shaped by the respective domestic political conditions, 
historical experiences or political cultures. However, these 
factors are not analysed in the present study. 
148 Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Poland, 
Proposal for a U. S. Permanent Presence in Poland (Warsaw, 2018), 
3f., https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-
ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Proposal-for-a-U.S.-
Permanent-Presence-in-Poland-2018.pdf (accessed 23 May 
2019); Edyta Żemła and Kamil Turecki, “Poland Offers US up 
to $2B for Permanent Military Base”, Politico.eu (online), 
27 May 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-poland-
The proposal has met with reservations in NATO, 
because it can be read as a special bilateral agreement 
between the USA and Poland and, moreover, contra-
dicts the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which 
Berlin (among others) insists must be observed. Po-
land’s intentions therefore risk splitting the Alliance. 
Demands for US troops to be more 
present in some eastern NATO 
countries may also reflect distrust 
of Trump. 
Other states in the eastern part of NATO have also 
shown interest in a larger and more permanent US 
military presence on their respective territories.149 
Diplomats from the Baltic countries sometimes 
express disappointment that, in the wake of the 
reassurance measures decided by NATO since 2014, 
the US military presence would focus primarily on 
Poland. In contrast, the deployment of troops in the 
Baltic States is limited to relatively short periods of 
multinational exercises with American participa-
tion.150 In April 2019, Lithuania became the first of 
the Baltic countries to sign a bilateral defence cooper-
ation agreement with the USA.151 Latvia and Estonia 
then followed suit with similar agreements. 
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149 On the corresponding discussion in Lithuania, see Ben 
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Putin”, Washington Times, 15 June 2018. 
150 Author interviews with diplomatic representatives 
from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in July/August 2018. 
151 See Sebastian Sprenger, “Lithuania Is First Baltic 
Nation to Sign US Defense-cooperation Pact”, Defense News 
(online), 3 April 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/ 
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However, these countries are not only interested in 
greater reassurance vis-à-vis Russia, but also vis-à-vis 
the uncertainties in American domestic policy. The 
former commander of the US army in Europe, General 
Ben Hodges, said that one of the reasons why the east-
ern Alliance partners had an interest in a permanent 
US military presence was “because they believe it 
would be a little bit more difficult for the U.S. to turn 
it off”.152 
Demands for a more extensive and permanent 
presence of US military may therefore also reflect to 
some degree a lack of confidence in President Trump. 
The mistrust of the exposed Allies also extends to 
other partners and NATO as a whole. Poland and the 
Baltic countries look with great scepticism at Ger-
many’s Russia policy.153 Germany’s adherence to 
the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline has increased these 
concerns. 
In the event of a political blockade in the NATO 
Council – a scenario whose probability grows with 
hybrid threats – the US would be the only ally that is 
capable of unilateral military action. Following this 
logic, the US is indispensable as a kind of “silent con-
ventional deterrence”.154 As Estonian President Kersti 
Kaljulaid put it in April 2018, “Some people might 
think that NATO takes a long time to act, but the US 
could be quicker. There is some rationale in this 
thinking.“155 
What is also decisive is that the US president’s 
criticisms of the NATO alliance are countered by the 
US’s ongoing operational-military cooperation with 
NATO states, a cooperation that in the eyes of some 
representatives of the eastern NATO states is now 
deeper and more far-reaching than under Obama’s 
presidency. 
From the point of view of the Baltic States, air 
defence and missile defence are especially delicate 
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153 See Konstantin Eggert, “Angela Merkel Faces Suspicion 
in Baltics”, Deutsche Welle (online), 13 September 2018, 
https://p.dw.com/p/34lCD (accessed 7 May 2019). 
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subjects. These countries feel extremely vulnerable 
given that their own resources in this sector are 
rudimentary or non-existent.156 Geography plays an 
equally important role here. The three countries 
border both Russia and the increasingly militarised 
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Moreover, they are 
only connected to the rest of NATO territory via a very 
narrow land corridor. 
In February 2018, for example, the USA responded 
to such concerns by sending the Patriot missile de-
fence system to Estonia, where it is being used for 
training purposes. Latvia, too, has repeatedly put the 
need to develop better air defence in the Baltic region 
on the agenda.157 The Baltic countries are also pres-
sing for NATO air policing158 to be further developed 
into air defence. This would mean more robust rules of 
engagement and deeper integration with ground-
based air defence systems.159 
These factors explain why, at least for some eastern 
NATO states, a continued or enhanced US presence 
remains of great security importance despite – or 
even because of – the imponderables of the Trump 
administration.160 It is noteworthy in this context that 
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Finland and Sweden also expanded their defence co-
operation with the USA in May 2018.161 As non-NATO 
states, they do not enjoy the benefit of the collective 
assistance pledge, but they hope to improve their 
security situation vis-à-vis Russia by greater coopera-
tion with the USA. 
The bi- and trilateral cooperation of Finland and 
Sweden with the USA will cover a total of seven 
issues, including regular meetings at various levels 
and the intensification of practical cooperation be-
tween the armed forces.162 According to a report, 
American M1A1 Abrams tanks first participated in 
exercises in Finland at the same time as the trilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed.163 
Nuclear Reassurance 
Russia’s nuclear weapons policy has created a great 
deal of uncertainty in the eastern allies.164 Neverthe-
less, different national views on the subject of nuclear 
deterrence and reassurance persist there, as a study 
by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) 
published in December 2018 shows. Poland and 
Romania (as well as France and the United Kingdom) 
are among the “true believers” in nuclear deterrence. 
The three Baltic republics, Bulgaria and the Czech 
 
section of the study are based on personal interviews the 
author had with representatives of the three Baltic republics, 
Poland and Romania in Berlin in the summer of 2018. 
161 See Shawn Snow, “Marines Are on Sweden’s Coast 
Preparing for Largest NATO Exercise as Russia Grumbles”, 
Marine Corps Times, 4 September 2018, https://www.marine 
corpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/09/04/marines-
are-on-swedens-coast-preparing-for-largest-nato-exercise-as-
russia-grumbles/ (accessed 7 May 2019). 
162 See Aaron Mehta, “Finland, Sweden and US Sign 
Trilateral Agreement, with Eye on Increased Exercises”, 
Defense News (online), 9 May 2018, https://www.defense 
news.com/training-sim/2018/05/09/finland-sweden-and-us-
sign-trilateral-agreement-with-eye-on-increased-exercises/ 
(accessed 7 May 2019). 
163 See Pauli Järvenpää, The United States, Finland and Sweden: 
A Trilateral Statement of Defense Interest, ICDS Blog 2018 (Tal-
linn: International Centre for Defence and Security [ICDS] 
Estonia, 25 May 2018), https://icds.ee/the-united-states-
finland-and-sweden-a-trilateral-statement-of-defense-interest/ 
(accessed 23 May 2019). 
164 See, e.g., Ministry of National Defence of the Republic 
of Lithuania, National Security Strategy of the Republic of Lithuania 
(Vilnius, 2017), 4, https://kam.lt/download/57457/2017-
nacsaugstrategijaen.pdf (accessed 23 May 2019). 
Republic, on the other hand, belong to the “pragma-
tists” when it comes to nuclear deterrence within 
NATO. Other countries such as Slovenia or Slovakia 
are “conformists” according to the ECFR, who con-
sider nuclear weapons to be less relevant than the 
other two groups.165 
The credibility of US nuclear commitments pledges 
under Trump is also assessed differently within the 
EU and the European NATO states. In Germany, for 
example, the prevailing opinion is that these com-
mitments have lost credibility during Trump’s term 
of office, while from Estonia’s and Poland’s point of 
view they have increased as the ECFR analysis indi-
cates. According to the authors, one possible expla-
nation for the latter two countries’ confidence is that 
Trump’s unpredictability may even increase the effect 
of nuclear deterrence.166 
Another study from 2018, which examined expec-
tations of nuclear deterrence in Estonia and Latvia, 
came to a similar conclusion: representatives of the 
security elites in these two countries considered 
Trump even as a presidential candidate to be more 
credible than his rival, Hillary Clinton, or President 
Barack Obama.167 
The significance of nuclear weapons 
for reassurance is primarily political; 
specific crisis and deployment 
scenarios are of little relevance. 
There is much to suggest that, despite the differ-
ences in the eastern alliance states’ perspectives, as 
described above, a “strategic” view of nuclear weap-
ons prevails. According to this view these weapons 
are an important, sometimes even indispensable, part 
of European security and deterrence.168 They com-
 
165 See Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Tara Varma and Nick 
Witney, Eyes Tight Shut: European Attitudes towards Nuclear 
Deterrence, Flash Scorecard (London: European Council on 
Foreign Relations [ECFR], December 2018), 4–5, 
https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/NUCLEAR_WEAPONS_FLASH_ 
SCORECARD.pdf (accessed 23 May 2019). 
166 Ibid., 7. 
167 See Viljar Veebel, “(Un)Justified Expectations on 
Nuclear Deterrence of Non-nuclear NATO Members. The Case 
of Estonia and Latvia?”, Defense & Security Analysis 34, no. 3 
(2018): 291–309 (300). 
168 For the corresponding Latvian position, see Ashish 
Kumar Sen, “Nuclear Component Must Be Part of NATO’s 
Deterrence Policy in Europe’s East, Says Latvia’s Foreign 
Minister” (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 26 February 
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pensate for the regional imbalance in conventional 
armed forces in terms of deterrence,169 but they have 
little or no military value in the event that deterrence 
fails. Seen from this perspective, the non-strategic 
weapons of the USA also play a primarily political role 
in Europe as transatlantic anchors, and as an expres-
sion of American solidarity to the Alliance.170 
Accordingly, the eastern allies were long regarded 
as advocates of the status quo within NATO when it 
came to nuclear weapons policy.171 They were against 
a unilateral withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons 
from Europe without corresponding quid pro quo 
from Russia.172 Deteriorating relations with Russia 
since 2014 and the uncertainties of the Trump 
administration do not seem to have fundamentally 
changed their preference for the status quo ante. 
States that joined the Alliance in 1999 and 2004 as 
part of its eastward enlargement are currently not 
 
2016), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ 
nuclear-component-must-be-part-of-nato-s-deterrence-policy-
in-europe-s-east-says-latvia-s-foreign-minister (accessed 23 
May 2019). 
169 See Veebel, “(Un)Justified Expectations on Nuclear 
Deterrence” (see note 167), 299. 
170 See Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), 
The Central and Eastern European Resource Collection on Nuclear 
Issues. Estonia (Warsaw, 28 April 2015), 2, 
https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=19768 (accessed 23 May 
2019). See also Liviu Horovitz, “Why Do They Want Ameri-
can Nukes? Central and Eastern European Positions Regard-
ing US Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons”, European Security 23, 
no. 1 (2014): 73–89 (74f.): “None of the CES [Central Eastern 
States’] experts interviewed for this article could outline a 
tactical scenario in which these weapons could serve as a 
reliable deterrent.” 
171 See Andrew Somerville et al., Poland, NATO and 
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Occasional Paper 
(European Leadership Network, February 2012), 13, 
https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Poland.-NATO-and-NSNW-in-
Europe.pdf (accessed 23 May 2019); Stephan Frühling and 
Andrew O’Neil, “Nuclear Weapons, the United States and 
Alliances in Europe and Asia. Toward an Institutional 
Perspective”, Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 1 (2017): 4–
25 (16). 
172 See Łukasz Kulesa, Polish and Central European Priorities 
on NATO’s Future Nuclear Policy, Nuclear Policy Paper 2/2010 
(Washington, D.C., London and Hamburg: Arms Control 
Association [ACA], British American Security Information 
Council [BASIC], Institute for Peace Research and Security 
Policy at the University of Hamburg [IFSH], November 2010), 
9, https://www.basicint.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ 
Nuclear_Policy_Paper_No_2.pdf (accessed 8 May 2019). 
advocating that nuclear weapons be stationed on 
their territory. 
Thus far, this has also applied to Poland, although 
official government representatives have at times 
aired different ideas. In December 2015, for example, 
the Polish Deputy Minister of Defence, Tomasz Szat-
kowski, was quoted as saying that his country was 
actively working to become a member of NATO’s 
nuclear sharing arrangements. However, the Polish 
Ministry of Defence immediately denied such con-
siderations.173 
Following the announcement that Washington 
would withdraw from the INF Treaty, the Polish 
Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz advocated the 
deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe 
at the beginning of 2019.174 However, the Foreign 
Ministry immediately clarified that Poland did not re-
quest such weapons for itself, but only that the USA 
retain a nuclear presence in Europe.175 
Poland attaches particular importance to nuclear 
threats compared to conventional or hybrid ones.176 
For the Baltic countries, the focus is more on non-
nuclear means of reassurance,177 as they are particu-
larly afraid of fait accompli and hybrid scenarios. 
A high-ranking foreign policy official from Latvia 
commented that if the nuclear component came into 
play – for example to deter a nuclear escalation by 
Russia – it would be too late for his country any-
way. By then Latvia would already be occupied 
militarily.178 
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cember 2015, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
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Arms Control Association, January/February 2016), https:// 
www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_0102/News-Briefs/Poland-
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174 See Jan Puhl and Markus Becker, “Aus für INF-
Abkommen: Polens Außenminister für US-Atomwaffen 
in Europa”, Spiegel Online, 1 February 2019, https://www. 
spiegel.de/politik/ausland/inf-abkommen-polnischer-
aussenminister-fordert-us- atomraketen-in-europa-a-
1251157.html (accessed 21 May 2019). 
175 See Gutschker, “Amerika plant kein Wettrüsten” 
(see note 146). 
176 See Rapnouil et al, Eyes Tight Shut (see note 165), 6. 
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Deterrence” (see note 167), 304; Kulesa, Polish and Central 
European Priorities (see note 172), 7. 
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For both conventional and nuclear reassurance, 
the credibility of the US must be assessed in relation 
to European alternatives.179 From the perspective of 
many eastern allies, Europe’s strategic autonomy 
remains less credible than the US offer. 
This assessment was summed up, for example, by 
Jarosław Kaczyński, chairman of the governing Law 
and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, and an influential 
politician in his country. Although he spoke in favour 
of Europe as a nuclear power in principle, he regarded 
it as unrealistic. That is why according to him Poland 
and Europe should continue to cultivate close rela-
tions with the USA, even under Trump.180 
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note 165), 10. 
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Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (online), 7 February 2017, 
https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/kaczynski-
wuenscht-sich-fuer-polen-einen-sieg-merkels-14859766.html 
(accessed 8 May 2019). 
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This study’s line of inquiry was how credible US 
security commitments within NATO are, and what 
political and security policy implications for Europe 
result from the findings. Two out of three factors at 
the heart of the analysis suggest that the credibility 
of US reassurance in Europe has declined markedly. 
Since Donald Trump’s inauguration as President of 
the United States, considerable doubts have been 
raised as to whether the United States would actually 
summon up the political will to defend its NATO 
partners with conventional, let alone nuclear, means. 
The unanimous support that the US Alliance com-
mitments continue to enjoy in Congress, large parts 
of the administration and the military can at best par-
tially compensate for this deficit. In the event of a 
crisis or war, the president is the person who really 
matters. 
The changes in the security environment also cast 
doubt on the credibility of American reassurance. The 
expansion of Alliance territory in the wake of NATO’s 
eastward enlargement since 1999, the accentuation of 
regional military imbalances in eastern and north-
eastern Europe, and the modernisation of the Russian 
military have – from Washington’s perspective – 
raised the potential costs and risks associated with the 
US’s security commitments. During the “unipolar 
moment” in the 1990s, when the US military supe-
riority was still unchallenged and the circle of allies 
was much smaller, these commitments seemed 
relatively “cheap” from Washington’s point of view. 
This is no longer the case. 
At the same time, these developments have led to 
a strong increase in the need for security – in other 
words, the demand for reassurance – in some east-
ern NATO countries. The allies particularly exposed 
to Russia, such as Poland, the Baltic republics or 
Romania, but also the non-NATO states Finland and 
Sweden, have intensified their bilateral defence coop-
eration with the United States since 2014. 
The uncertainties related to Donald Trump’s 
presidency have not lessened, but rather increased, 
efforts to expand and consolidate the US military 
presence in Europe. To the extent that the domestic 
political foundations of American credibility appear 
uncertain, the significance of the specific financial, 
military and operational contributions of the USA for 
the reassurance of its allies deepens. 
During both the Obama presidency and the first 
two-and-half years of Trump’s presidency, the US has 
made contributions in areas where European defence 
is still seriously flawed and where some Eastern Euro-
pean NATO countries feel very vulnerable. This in-
cludes, inter alia, reconnaissance and air defence, as 
well as the deployment of army units equipped with 
heavy tanks. 
Some states, such as France or Germany, consider 
the security threat posed by Russia to be comparative-
ly low for various reasons. It seems plausible to assume 
that these countries can afford a rather “abstract” 
understanding of the credibility of American reas-
surance. This understanding is based mainly on the 
statements of the US President and less on specific 
military contributions of the United States. 
Trump’s ambivalent statements about NATO and 
his “America First” programme have raised the legiti-
mate question as to whether this particular President 
would really be willing to use nuclear weapons to 
defend the allies in extremis. And yet neither allies 
nor opponents can predict with any certainty how the 
US president would react in the event of a crisis. In 
view of the enormous destructive power of nuclear 
weapons, miscalculations would have catastrophic 
consequences. Like previous governments, the Trump 
administration has unambiguously committed itself 
to extended nuclear deterrence. Against this back-
ground, some NATO countries, especially eastern 
NATO countries, continue to believe that the US nu-
clear umbrella remains credible – or at least more 
credible than the possible alternative of a purely 
European deterrent. 
However, Trump’s nuclear planners want to fur-
ther underpin the credibility of the nuclear commit-
ments by making America’s nuclear options more 
flexible. This is to be achieved primarily by the 
development of new weapons with lower explosive 
yield and the reintroduction of a sea-based, nuclear-
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armed cruise missile. The underlying idea is that the 
US could limit the damage to itself if nuclear weap-
ons were used in a regional war in Europe or Asia. By 
the same logic, this also increases the credibility of its 
security commitments to its allies. 
By contrast, eastern Allies have a more political and 
strategic understanding of the importance of nuclear 
weapons. Thus, specific questions of nuclear capa-
bility – how many nuclear bombs are stationed on 
which carrier systems, and what their explosive yield 
is – are less important for them. Similarly, where the 
non-strategic nuclear weapons of the USA in Europe 
are concerned, from an assurance perspective it is 
fundamentally crucial that they are there. 
The credibility of US security commitments – 
both conventional and nuclear – is a multifaceted 
phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the US presi-
dent’s statements alone. The European NATO states 
consider and weight the underlying factors different-
ly. Greater insight among political decision-makers, 
not least in Germany, about this diversity is indispen-
sable for further political cohesion in the EU and 
NATO. 
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